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ARTICLES
The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline
LESLIE C. LEVIN*
Each year state disciplinary agencies receive more than 125,000 lawyer
discipline complaints against the 1.3 million lawyers in the United States.1 More
than 5,600 sanctions are imposed annually on lawyers.2 Yet remarkably little is
known about the effectiveness of lawyer discipline or the fairness of the
discipline systems. Of course, questions of effectiveness and fairness are difficult
to evaluate under the best of circumstances. But the difficulty of evaluation is
compounded by the fact that in many jurisdictions, discipline complaints,
discipline files, and even many discipline sanctions are private. Even states with
relatively "public" disciplinary processes shield much information from the
public.
Critiques of the private nature of lawyer discipline go back to at least 1970,
when the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, headed by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom C.
Clark ("the Clark Commission"), studied lawyer discipline systems and declared
the situation "scandalous." 3 The Commission found that even discipline proceed-
ings against lawyers who had been convicted of crimes were maintained as
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to thank Jeremy Paul and Jim
Stark for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to Peter Siegelman, for
answering my questions about research methodology, and to Mark Dubois, for enhancing my understanding of
the operation of lawyer disciplinary systems.
1. The 2004 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems indicates that 126,748 complaints were received in 2004.
ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 2004, Chart 1 (2005)
[hereinafter SOLD 2004]. The number of complaints is clearly higher since some states provided only partial
data. More importantly, many lawyer disciplinary agencies screen complaints and many potential complainants
are discouraged from filing complaints or are directed to other venues before a complaint is filed. See infra notes
111-16 and accompanying text.
2. SOLD 2004, supra note 1, at Chart HI. This estimate is low, because some jurisdictions provided partial
data. It does not include the number of matters that are the subject of diversion agreements, in which lawyers
who engaged in "minor" misconduct agree to certain terms in order to avoid formal discipline sanctions. See
infra notes 15-17, 117 and accompanying text.
3. See ABA SPECIAL COMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970) [hereinafter PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT].
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confidential.4 While the Clark Commission prompted many states to make some
changes in their lawyer discipline systems, little changed in the secrecy that
surrounded the disciplinary process. More than twenty years later, when the
ABA's McKay Commission again looked at lawyer discipline systems, it
concluded that "[t]he Commission is convinced that secrecy in discipline
proceedings continues to be the greatest single source of public distrust of lawyer
disciplinary systems."5 Yet even today, much of the lawyer discipline process in
many states remains secret.
Proponents of continued secrecy offer several reasons for why secrecy may
contribute to more fair and effective lawyer discipline. Chief among those
reasons are concerns about protecting the integrity of investigations, concerns
about administrative efficiency, and concerns that lawyers may be seriously
harmed by the disclosure of frivolous complaints. These arguments for secrecy
are not without merit, especially early in the process. The more carefully one
looks at the issue, however, the more it appears that in some cases, these concerns
are exaggerated, and in other cases, these concerns are outweighed by competing
considerations.
Moreover, the secrecy surrounding most lawyer discipline in this country
makes the fairness and effectiveness of the discipline process virtually impos-
sible to ascertain. It seems clear that the unavailability of discipline information
not only hurts consumers of legal services-who may be victimized by lawyers
who have been secretly sanctioned in the past-but also affects the legal
profession and the public at large. Four examples make this point.
(1) The Extent of Recidivism. It is no secret that some lawyers who have been
sanctioned continue to engage in misconduct,6 but no one-not even bar
disciplinary counsel-knows how much recidivism actually occurs.7 In many
cases, lawyers receive numerous private sanctions before they ever receive a
public sanction. 8 They may then receive a few public sanctions before they are
either suspended from practice for a substantial length of time or disbarred.9
4. Id. at 140-41.
5. ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW
CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 33 (1992) [hereinafter
LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENRuY].
6. This is not a new problem. More than fifty years ago the problem of recidivism among some lawyers who
received discipline was noted. ORE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS: A
STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ETHiCS, DISCIPLINE AND DISBARMENT 124-25 (1952).
7. An e-mail inquiry sent to disciplinary counsel on the National Organization of Bar Counsel listserv asking
whether they kept information about recidivism produced no affirmative responses and disciplinary counsel
from several states, including Maryland, Nevada, and Texas, responded that they did not compile such
information. Some noted that it would be a good idea to do so.
8. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline Standards, 48 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 48 n.218 (1998) [hereinafter Levin, Emperor's Clothes].
9. For example, one lawyer in Connecticut received forty-four complaints and three reprimands over an
eleven year period before he was ultimately disbarred. See Thomas D. Williams, Disciplining Bad Lawyers a
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Although there has been very little study of recidivism, the limited data suggest
that the rate of recidivism among lawyers who receive public sanctions is fairly
high. ° Indeed, in apparent recognition of this problem, some jurisdictions have
instituted a "three strikes" rule, which provides that if a lawyer receives three
reprimands within five years, he will be presented to the court for more serious
discipline.1 '
While the rate of recidivism for lawyers who receive public sanctions is hard to
determine, the rate of recidivism among lawyers who receive private sanctions is
altogether unknown. In some jurisdictions, it is unknowable. Some state
discipline systems do not maintain all of their discipline records after a period of
time, 12 making it difficult to determine-even for those "inside" the discipline
system-how much recidivism actually occurs. It seems reasonable to assume
that private discipline, which by its nature is not typically made known to other
lawyers, has little general deterrent effect on the legal community. 13 But it
appears that private discipline may not even serve as a specific deterrent for many
lawyers who receive a sanction. If private discipline-which is the most common
form of discipline in many jurisdictions 4 "is ineffective, the question must be
asked whether it should be used at all.
(2) Do Diversion Programs Work? A closely related question to the one about
recidivism among those who receive lawyer sanctions is whether diversion
programs work. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, complaints of "minor"
misconduct are referred by state discipline agencies to "diversion" programs,
Long, Slow Process and While State Panel Deliberates, Questionable Attorneys Continue to Practice,
HARTFoRD CouRANT, Mar. 7, 2004, at Al.
10. A study of Louisiana discipline cases from 1975-2000 revealed that 85% of the disbarred lawyers who
applied for reinstatement succeeded and 44% of those lawyers were subsequently disciplined. See Terry Carter,
Bounced from the Bar: Lawyers Who Lose Their Licenses for Fraud or Other Misconduct Can Win
Reinstatement, If They Practice in the Right State, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2003, at 56. It appears that in Michigan, where
it is possible to track the public sanctions going back to 1978, more than one-third of the lawyers who receive
public sanctions are recidivists who have received public discipline on more than one occasion. See Attorney
Discipline Board, State of Michigan, Disciplined Lawyers, http://www.adbmich.org/checker.htm (last visited
Dec. 8, 2006).
11. See, e.g., WASH. RULES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF LAWYER CoNDucr R. 13.6 (2005) [hereinafter WASH.
RuLES]; Lisa Siegel, Lawyer Reprimand Not a Wrist Slap Anymore: Bristol Attorney First to Discover the Force
of "Four Strikes" Rule, CON. L. Twa., Feb. 13, 2006, at 1. I use the term "he" here, and throughout much of
this article, because most of the discipline imposed on lawyers is imposed on men.
12. See, e.g., DIscdnLiNARY CODE FOR THE WYO. STATE BAR § 5(d) (2003) (records of documents relating to
disciplinary proceedings retained for six years).
13. A private sanction is usually communicated only to the offending lawyer and his counsel. In some states,
a general description of the matter is published in the legal press, or occasionally, on judicial websites. See, e.g.,
Government of Massachusetts, Mass.gov, 2004 Admonitions, http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/admon2004.htm
(last visited Nov. 30, 2006). Even in jurisdictions that publish this information, however, the explanation of the
misconduct usually appears in highly abbreviated form. See, e.g., State Bar of Texas, News & Publications, TBJ
DisCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 67 TX. B.J. 589 (2004).
14. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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where records are typically confidential1 5 and where discipline sanctions are not
imposed.' 6 It is often not possible to determine how often or in what
circumstances diversion actually occurs, 17 and in some jurisdictions, those
records are not maintained by the discipline agency after a period of years.
18
At present, more than twenty jurisdictions have adopted diversion programs
that handle "minor" disciplinary matters outside the discipline system.' 9
Diversion requires the consent of the attorney and is only offered to lawyers who
have not recently been the subject of discipline. 20 Diversion may include law
office management assistance, lawyer assistance programs, 2' counseling, moni-
toring, and legal education.22 In certain respects, diversion operates like a private
sanction with conditions, with the added advantage for the lawyer that most
15. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF DISCipLINARY PROCEDURE R. 8.1(i) (2005) [hereinafter ALA. RULES]; RULES
GOVERNING THE Mo. BAR AND THE JUDIcIARY R. 5.105(j); 5.31 (2005) [hereinafter Mo. RULES].
16. In 1992, the McKay Commission recommended procedures in lieu of discipline for "minor misconduct,
minor incompetence or minor neglect." LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 5, at 48. The
Commission found that summary dismissal of cases involving minor neglect or minor incompetence was one of
the chief sources of public dissatisfaction with the discipline system. Id. at 47. It also noted that in many minor
disciplinary matters, fairness could be achieved by simpler and quicker procedures, thereby expediting their
resolution and making it possible to devote scarce discipline resources to more substantial cases of misconduct.
Id. at 50-52.
17. For example, Florida publishes no information about the number of diversions or the circumstances in
which diversion occurs. But see Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2004 State of the Attorney Discipline System
Report, at 31, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2004OAEAnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter
2004 N.J. Discipline System Report] (describing the number of diversion agreements and most common
offenses giving rise to diversion). In only a few jurisdictions are the circumstances giving rise to diversion
actually described. See, e.g., From the Courts: Matters Resulting in Diversion and Private Admonition, COLO.
LAW., Jan. 2003, at 111.
18. See, e.g., Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of Diversion: Empirical Evidence that Alternative Discipline is
Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1221, 1236 (2003) (noting that diversion records are expunged
three years after completion of diversion so records of lawyers who received diversion are no longer in
disciplinary agency's database); Melvin Hirshman, Remedy: Managing Conditional Diversion in Maryland, 52
EMORY L.J. 1271, 1275 (2003) (noting that after a Maryland attorney successfully completes the conditional
diversion agreement, the file is destroyed and there will be no record of the complaint against the attorney).
19. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have formal diversion programs. Illinois
permits its Inquiry Board to defer consideration of a matter while the attorney meets conditions imposed by the
Board. See ILL. RULES OF THE ATr'Y REGISTRATION AND DIscipLnNARY COMMISSION R. 108(a) (2005).
20. See, e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 3-5.3(c) (2005) [hereinafter FLA. RULES] ("A respondent
who has been the subject of a prior diversion within 7 years shall not be eligible for diversion."); OKLA. RULES
GOVERNING LAWYER DIscn'LINARY PROCEEDINGS R. 5.1(c)(4) (2004) ("lesser misconduct" subject to diversion
does not include misconduct of same nature for which lawyer was disciplined within last five years). "Minor
misconduct" usually means conduct that would not result in suspension from law practice and that does not
involve misappropriation of funds or fraud or deceit. E.g., ALA. RULES R. 8. 1(c); Mo. RULES R. 5.105(c).
21. Lawyer Assistance Programs are designed to provide confidential assistance to lawyers with alcohol
abuse, drug dependency, or mental health problems. See, e.g., Illinois Lawyers' Assistance Program,
http://www.illinoislap.org (last visited Nov. 28, 2006); North Carolina Lawyer Assistance Program, http://
www.nclap.org (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
22. See, e.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 251.13 (2006); WASH. RULES R. 6.1.
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traces of it disappear once the terms of the diversion are satisfied.23
It appears that as many as 20%-35% of the cases that might otherwise result in
discipline are being sent to diversion programs.24 The secrecy surrounding the
process makes it impossible to determine whether diversion decisions are being
made appropriately, or whether diversion is being used to shield lawyers who
engage in misconduct from disciplinary sanctions. Nor is it known whether
diversion "works." The only published study concludes that lawyers who
successfully completed a diversion program subsequently received fewer and
less severe charges than lawyers who either did not participate in diversion or did
not complete the program,25 but the study has some serious limitations.26 Aside
from this study, remarkably little is known about how well diversion programs
work generally or how well individual diversion options work. 27 Little is also
23. The most significant difference between diversion and a private admonition is that the latter is a
"sanction" and the former is not. Both are private, however, and are only available when "minor" misconduct
occurs. In some jurisdictions, both may be considered if the lawyer is later subject to another discipline
proceeding. In contrast to private sanctions, diversion programs have an educational and rehabilitative goal, but
when private sanctions are accompanied by conditions such as attending an ethics school or obtaining
psychological counseling, they function in virtually the same manner.
24. It is difficult to get a clear sense of the extent to which such programs are being utilized nationwide, but
some individual state discipline reports from 2004 shed light on this question. For example, in New Jersey,
diversion was granted to 68 lawyers, while 177 lawyers received formal discipline. 2004 N.J. Discipline System
Report, supra note 17, at 13, 24. In Washington, 32 lawyers were diverted from discipline, while 76 disciplinary
sanctions were imposed. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Lawyer Discipline in Wash., Annual Report 2004, at 1-2,
available at http://www.wsba.org/public/complaints/odc2004annualreportpdf.pdf [hereinafter Wash. State Bar
2004 Annual Report]. In Louisiana, 626 matters were diverted to the bar-sponsored diversion program, but it is
not clear how many other complaints proceeded to the investigative stage. Supreme Court of Louisiana, Annual
Report 2004, at 11, available at http://www.lasc.org/press-room/annual-reports/reports/2004-ar.pdf.
25. Using archival data that were not publicly available, Diane Ellis, the then-Director of the Arizona State
Bar's Law Office Management Assistance Program (LOMAP), attempted to assess the efficacy of Arizona's
ten-year-old diversion program for lawyers whose diversion involved services provided by LOMAP. See Diane
M. Ellis, Is Diversion a Viable Alternative to Traditional Discipline?: An Analysis of the First Ten Years in
Arizona, 14 PROF. LAW. 1, 8, 13 (2002) [hereinafter Ellis, Is Diversion a Viable Alternative?]; Ellis, supra note
18, at 1235-36.
26. Most notably, recidivism among some lawyers could not be fully tracked because diversion records were
expunged if lawyers received no charges for a three-year period after completing diversion. Ellis, supra note 18,
at 1232, 1236. In addition, the "control group" against which recidivism rates were compared included lawyers
who did not qualify for diversion because their offenses were too serious. Id. at 1237; Ellis, Is Diversion a
Viable Alternative?, supra note 25, at 9. While the statistics show that lawyers who completed diversion
subsequently received fewer and less severe charges than those lawyers who did not complete diversion, the
study did not account for how the absence or presence of a record of recent discipline (which would not exist for
lawyers who participated in diversion and had had their records expunged) might have affected the disciplinary
agency's evaluation of subsequent complaints about the lawyer and charging decisions.
27. For instance, while there is anecdotal evidence that lawyers who attend ethics schools experience fewer
discipline problems thereafter, e.g., John T. Berry e-mail, there has been no systematic effort to test this belief.
Similarly, some states have estimated that as much as 60% to 80% of all lawyer discipline matters are due, in
part, to substance abuse. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Young Lawyers' Division, Commission on Impaired
Attorneys, Report to the House of Delegates, 1 I, available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/
colap/clesubstanceabusepolicy.pdf. However, little is known about whether diversion to lawyer assistance
programs is helpful in reducing subsequent discipline complaints.
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known about whether only truly "minor" misconduct is being diverted into
diversion programs or whether, as Colorado has reported, some agencies are
diverting because of the pressure to relieve backlog in the traditional discipline
system.28 The fact that diversion is typically maintained as confidential and that
records of diversion may not be maintained for long after diversion is complete,
make it very difficult to evaluate the efficacy of diversion programs.
29
(3) Fairness Based on Firm Size. It is no secret that solo and small firm
practitioners receive the vast majority of disciplinary complaints and that large
firm lawyers are subjected to relatively little public lawyer discipline. 30 The
concern that discipline decisionmakers are biased against solo and small firm
practitioners is prevalent.31 For example, more than 47% of Oregon lawyers felt
there was bias in the discipline system, and the most common reason for the bias
was the size of the respondent's law firm.32 In California, the State Bar
commissioned an outside consultant in response to concerns that there was
institutional bias against solo and small firm lawyers. It concluded that there was
no institutional bias, largely because the number of complaints received against
solo and small firm lawyers was not disproportionate to the percentage of
disciplinary cases prosecuted and completed against solo and small firm
lawyers.33 Unfortunately, it did not consider that what becomes a "complaint" is
determined by the State Bar staff and that fully three-quarters of the inquiries
28. See Highlights of New Grievance Process, WHOOPS! NEWSLETTER, Mar. 2000, (Colo. B. Ass'n, Denver,
CO), http://www.cobar.org/group/display.cfm?GenID=574 (last visited Nov. 22, 2006). The pressure felt by
those within the discipline system is no doubt substantial as many states now publish annual reports showing the
speed with which matters are resolved, in apparent response to pressure to dispose of discipline matters more
quickly. See, e.g., Va. State Bar, 67th Annual Report for the period July 1, 2004 - June 30, 2005, at 11, available
at http://www.vsb.orglanreportlO4-05/67thAnnReport.pdf.
29. There are a few exceptions. For example, the Kansas rules state that "[an attempt should be made to
monitor the recidivism rate for attorneys who successfully complete the [diversion] program." KAN. SUP. CT. R.
203(d)(3)(i) (2005).
30. For example, in California, 78.37% of disciplinary cases prosecuted and completed in 2000-2001 were
against solo practitioners, even though they represented only 23% of the lawyers practicing in that state. See
Report by the State Bar of California, Investigation and Prosecution of Disciplinary Complaints Against
Attorneys in Solo Practice, Small Size Law Firms and Large Size Law Firms, at 7-8, available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/200l-SB 143-Report.pdf [hereinafter Report by the State Bar of Califor-
nia]. Similarly, 34% of Texas lawyers are solo practitioners yet they receive 67% of all public sanctions. Frank
William McIntyre, Whose Interests Does Texas'Disciplinary Process Protect?, TEx. LAW., Aug. 5, 2002, at 27.
When Texas lawyers who practice in firms of two to five lawyers are added with solo practitioners, they
comprise 59% of all practicing lawyers yet they receive 98.5% of all public discipline. Id.; see also MICHAEL D.
PRATT, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSISTENCY OF DECISION-MAKINO WrrIN THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY
SYSTEM iii, 21 (2000) (noting that the greater the number of attorneys in practice, the lower the odds of receiving
public or private sanctions in Virginia).
31. See, e.g., Report by the State Bar of California, supra note 30, at 1; Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of
Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 Hous. L. REv. 309, 314, 381-83 (2004) [hereinafter Levin, Ethical
World].
32. Oregon State Bar, Oregon State Bar Disciplinary System Task Force Report, July 15, 2002,
http://www.osbar.org/barnews/monthly/disciplinary.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006).
33. Report by the State Bar of California, supra note 30, at 8-9.
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were dismissed, informally resolved, or diverted out of the discipline system.34
Bias may arise in the types of complaints that disciplinary agencies choose to
pursue 35 and in the severity of the sanctions imposed.
(4) Fairness to Minorities. Secrecy also makes it hard to determine whether
minorities are treated fairly by disciplinary agencies. There is a perception-at
least among minority lawyers-that minorities are treated differently than others
in the discipline process. For instance, there was an outcry when the New Jersey
Office of Attorney Ethics targeted solo attorneys for random audits because a
disproportionate number of minority lawyers practice in that setting.36 Findings
from an Illinois perception survey indicate that a substantial minority of
responding African-American lawyers strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with
the statement that the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission's
("ARDC") decision whether to act on a case was influenced by the race of the
complaining witness. 37 A majority of African-American lawyers-but very few
white lawyers-felt that race played a part in the investigation and discipline of
Illinois lawyers.38
Three states have tried to determine whether minorities are in fact treated
differently, but their reports raise as many questions as they answer. Both the
Illinois ARDC and the New Mexico State Bar found, respectively, that
African-American and Hispanic lawyers received a disproportionate number of
discipline sanctions, but noted that these minority lawyers disproportionately
34. Id. at 9-10. The availability of diversion often rests on the ability to pay for it. See, e.g., CoLo. R. Civ. P.
251(d) (2005); Mo. RULES R. 5.105(e)(4). This may make it likely that large firm lawyers with larger incomes
can avail themselves of diversion. The ability to make restitution and thereby resolve conflicts with clients may
also advantage large firm lawyers in the discipline process. See, e.g., In re Edelman, No. SB-02-0095-D, 2002
Ariz. Lexis 131, at *16 (Ariz. Aug. 7, 2002); In re Fischer, 89 P.3d 817, 821 (Colo. 2004); In re Arabia, 19 P.3d
113, 118 (Kan. 2001) (treating restitution as a mitigating factor when imposing discipline).
35. The few mechanisms that have been instituted by disciplinary agencies to detect lawyer misconduct are
more likely to reveal problems with solo and small firm lawyers than with large firm lawyers. For example,
random audits and requirements that banks report overdrafts in client trust accounts are more likely to reveal
problems with solo and small firm lawyers, who may not have a bookkeeper to properly maintain the account or
who may not be able to keep "extra" funds in a trust account. See Levin, Ethical World, supra note 31, at 357-59,
n. 158. Discipline agencies have established no similar mechanism for auditing bill padding, which is reportedly
pervasive in many large firm practices. See Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study ofAssociate
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REv. 239, 277-79
(2000); Lisa G. Lerman, A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty: Billing Fraud Versus Misappropriation, 34
HOFSTRA L. Rav. 847, 889 (2006).
36. Allyson Lee Moore, Study Urges Changes in OAE Audits, N.J. L.J., Nov. 21, 1991, at 1. There has also
been occasional litigation charging racial bias in the lawyer discipline system. See, e.g., Mosby v. Ligon, 418
F.3d 927, 930-32 (8th Cir. 2005).
37. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 2002 Annual Report
of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, available at http://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport02/
2002annual_report.html (31.4% of black lawyers agreed with this statement). The survey involved 1,306
telephone interviews of Illinois lawyers. Id.
38. Id. Only 28% of African American lawyers, as compared to 39.8% of white lawyers, felt that the
disciplinary process was "very fair." Id.
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practice in solo settings. 39The Virginia State Bar study examined the consistency
of decision-making within the lawyer discipline system40 and concluded that
differences in race were not statistically significant in explaining a case's
resolution at a 95% confidence level.4 ' Although the studies represent a
good-faith effort to study the question of bias, they do not answer many important
questions. For example, while the Illinois and New Mexico data reveal that
minorities practice disproportionately in a solo setting, the reports do not reveal
whether minorities in solo practice receive the percentage of sanctions that their
numbers would suggest.42 Nor is there close analysis in any of the studies of
whether white and minority attorneys received similarly severe sanctions for
similar conduct.43 In addition, there has been no effort to examine whether there
is bias in the initial handling of complaints about minority lawyers, including in
the decisions about diversion. These questions raise serious concerns about the
39. The Illinois ARDC examined the race of lawyers sanctioned from 1998-2002. Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 2003 Annual Report of the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission, available at http://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport03/2003main-annreport.html
[hereinafter 2003 ARDC Report]. It found that African-American lawyers comprised 11% of the lawyers
sanctioned, but did not identify the percentage of Illinois lawyers who are African-American. Id. Most available
statistics indicate that the percentage is not much higher than 4%. See ELIZABErH CHAMBLISS, MILES TO Go:
PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 5 (2004).
The New Mexico Bar Commissioners looked at serious disciplinary sanctions imposed from 1988-1998. See
The State Bar of New Mexico Task Force on Minorities in the Legal Profession II, Report, The Status of
Minority Attorneys in New Mexico-An Update, 1990-1999, at 43-46, available at http://www.nmbar.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Publications-Media/Reports-Surveys/Minority-Attorneys-in-New-Mexico/
minoritytaskforcereport.pdf. During the relevant period, Hispanic attorneys represented only between
14%-17% of all active attorneys, but they received 26% of all serious sanctions. Id. at 45. Thirty-eight
percent of all active Hispanic attorneys are solo practitioners. Id. at 46.
40. Consistency was examined by looking at lawyer characteristics in closed discipline cases during
1997-1999. PRATr, supra note 30, at i. Lawyers who were the subject of complaints were sent brief surveys
asking them to supply some practice information and gender and race information. Although the response rate
was 76% for the closed cases, a disproportionate number of lawyers who resigned while under investigation did
not respond to the survey. Id. at ii, 7.
41. id. at 18. The study appears to be methodologically problematic in a few respects. First, although it had a
relatively high response rate, there is some bias because those who were being investigated for the most serious
offenses disproportionately did not respond. Id. at 7-8. Moreover, the question of whether a sanction was
imposed was treated as a yes/no variable, while the severity of the sanctions imposed on one ethnic group may
have been significantly greater than the sanction imposed on another. Similarly, not all dismissals are equal. For
example, it appears that African-American lawyers received disproportionately more "dismissals on terms" (for
example, with conditions) than white lawyers, but there was no indication whether the difference was
statistically significant. See id. at 39. Finally, it is not clear from the report whether the in-house staff or
members of the district committees were aware that this study was being conducted during 1997-1999, which
could have altered the behavior of the decisionmakers.
42. For instance, if minorities comprise 20% of all solo attorneys in a state, they should theoretically be
receiving approximately 20% of all discipline imposed on solo lawyers. However, those figures are not
available anywhere.
43. The Illinois study does reflect that African-American attorneys receive the same percentage of
disbarments as white attorneys (30%) and that white attorneys receive somewhat more private sanctions than
African-American attorneys. 2003 ARDC Report, supra note 39. It is not clear, however, whether the
differences in private discipline are statistically significant.
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fairness of the discipline system, and most of them cannot be answered because
the required information is confidential in most jurisdictions.
The secrecy surrounding the discipline process makes it impossible to answer
the questions posed above. Yet these questions go to the heart of the efficacy and
fairness of the discipline system. The absence of answers to these questions and
the shroud of secrecy surrounding the process have significant real world
consequences. First and most obviously, if private sanctions and diversion do not
work, they should not be used, because they do not protect the public. Second, if a
significant segment of the lawyer population does not view the lawyer discipline
process as fair, these lawyers may have less respect for the discipline system and
the rules of professional conduct that the system attempts to enforce. Third, the
secrecy surrounding lawyer discipline may fundamentally affect how complain-
ants view the fairness of the discipline process." Finally, secrecy affects the
general public's perception of the fairness and legitimacy of the lawyer discipline
system and how well that system actually protects the public."5
This article examines the secrecy that continues to surround lawyer discipline
in many jurisdictions and lays out the case for further opening up the discipline
process. Part I provides a brief history of lawyer discipline and notes that the
process was open to the public until the beginning of the twentieth century. Part II
provides an overview of the current lawyer discipline process in this country and
the sanctions imposed on lawyers. Part III looks at the rationales for private
lawyer discipline and the countervailing interests in open access to the discipline
process. It notes that while there may be a credible argument for keeping lawyer
discipline complaints private until after an initial review of a docketed complaint,
the arguments for a private process thereafter and for private discipline do not
withstand scrutiny. Part IV examines the First Amendment and common law
44. The only systematic study of discipline complainants reveals that they are generally dissatisfied with the
state of lawyer discipline. When the Florida Bar announced an initiative to look at how it disciplines lawyers, it
reportedly "had no idea the genie it had unleashed," and it was "deluged with e-mails and letters-from
attorneys, disgruntled clients and citizens at large." John Pacenti, Florida Bar Scrutinizes Discipline for
Lawyers, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at IA. More then three-quarters of the 907 complainants who
responded to the Florida 2004 Disciplinary Survey believed that the proceedings were not fair to all concerned,
and one common reason for the feeling of unfairness was that the proceedings seemed biased in favor of
attorneys. Florida Bar, Results of the 2004 Disciplinary Review Survey at ii, 3 (2004).
45. HALT-An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform, is a public interest group that claims to have
more than 50,000 members. HALT has advocated that lawyer discipline should be public for more than 25
years. See About HALT, http://www.halt.org/about-halt (last visited Nov. 28, 2006); HALT, 2006 Lawyer
Discipline Report Card, http://www.halt.org/reform-projects/lawyer-accountability/report_card2006 [herein-
after Lawyer Discipline Report Card] (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). HALT contends that some of the problems
with state discipline systems are the inadequacy of the discipline actually imposed, the failure to investigate
many grievances, the fact that the hearing process is often closed, the difficulty of obtaining information about
lawyer discipline history, and the perceived secrecy and unfairness of the discipline procedures. See HALT,
Report Card: What's New Since 2002, http://halt.org/reformprojects/lawyeraccountability/report card_2006/
whatsnew-since_2002.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2006).
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cases relating to access to lawyer disciplinary and judicial information, and it
suggests possible legal arguments for opening up more discipline information to
the public. This analysis reveals, however, that the case law does not provide a
right of access to all of the lawyer discipline information that is needed to protect
the public. The article concludes by suggesting that we need rules that provide
more access to lawyer discipline information in order to protect the public, to
answer some of the important empirical questions identified in this article, and to
restore confidence in the fairness of lawyer discipline.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE
Prior to the last century, lawyer discipline was conducted in public in the
United States and in England. The earliest provision regulating the conduct of
lawyers was the First Statute of Westminster, Chapter 29 (1275), which provided
that "if any Serjeant, Pleader or other, do any manner of Deceit or Collusion in
any King's Court... he shall be imprisoned for a year and a day and from
thenceforth shall not be heard to plead in [that] Court for any Man."4 6 The
statutes and ordinances regulating lawyers, which began to appear during the
thirteenth century, made no provision for private complaints, private proceed-
ings, or private discipline. Lawyer discipline was imposed after fact-finding by
judges or juries composed of lawyers.47 The discipline imposed on lawyers
during the medieval period included disbarment, temporary suspensions, fines,
and imprisonment.4 8
In 1605, Parliament enacted "An Act to Reform the Multitudes & Misdemean-
ors of Attorneys & Solicitors at Law, and to Avoid Unnecessary Suits and
Charges at Law," known as 3 James 1, which provided for disbarment and treble
damages for lawyers who delayed their clients' cases for private gain.4 9 In 1654,
both the King's Bench and the Common Pleas provided for summoning special
juries every three years to put an end to unethical practices by attorneys.5 0 The
purpose of these juries was to inquire into falsities, contempts, and other offenses,
and to establish a system for inquiry into the conduct of attorneys for the purpose
46. HENRY S. DRiNKER, LEGAL ETHics 14-15 (1953). The term "deceit" was interpreted broadly by the courts
and included candor to the court and duties to the client. See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for
Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REv. 1385, 1395 (2004). The statute was applied not only to
serjeants-who were the pleaders who represented the King-but also to attorneys. See generally Jonathan
Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 61 app. III
(1998).
47. Rose, supra note 46, at 60-6 1.
48. Id. at 61.
49. An Act to reform the Multitudes and Misdemeanors of Attornies and Solicitors at Law, and to avoid
unnecessary Suits and Charges in Law, 3 JAMEs 1, ch. 7, STATUTES AT LARGE; see also Andrews, supra note 46,
at 1406.
50. Charles S. Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 Thx. L. REv. 161 (1945).
[Vol. 20:1
LESS SECRECY IN LAWYER DISCIPLINE
of aiding the courts in the discipline and removal of attorneys.5'
During the American colonial period, the laws governing lawyer discipline and
the methods of imposing discipline were often borrowed directly from En-
gland.52 For example, in colonial North Carolina, lawyer regulation was
controlled, in part, by the First Statute of Westminister (1275) and 3 James 1
(1605). 3 In Rhode Island, the Act of 1647 specifically referred to two English
statutes dealing with attorneys and provided that if any "Attorney shall use any
manner of deceit ... he shall forfeit his place, and never more be admitted to
plead in any Court of the Colonie. ' 54 In Pennsylvania in 1722, "An Act for
Establishing Courts of Judicature in the Provinces" provided that admitted
attorneys who misbehaved in court "shall suffer such penalties and suspensions
",55as attorneys at law in Great Britain are liable to in such cases ....
In the American colonies, both the courts and the Crown's governors claimed
the power to disbar.5 6 Disbarment proceedings handled by the courts were
commonly conducted as an equity suit or a contempt proceeding. 7 The
proceeding occasionally involved the appointment of a committee of lawyers or a
referee who would conduct an investigation and submit a report. For example, in
New York in the 1720s, a standing "Committee to Hear Grievances in the
Practice of Law" reportedly was formed, and in order to insure that problems
came to light, "all Publick Countenance and Encouragement" was given to "all
Persons to come and complain. 58
Following the American Revolution and until the twentieth century, the lawyer
51. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 491 (N.Y 1928); Andrews, supra note 46, at 1406. Starting in the
seventeenth century, barristers reportedly also could be disbarred by the Benchers of his Inn. See ROSCOE
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN ToIEs 99-100 (1953). However, it is not clear whether the
Benchers exercised this prerogative when a barrister engaged in misconduct.
52. There was also considerable anti-lawyer legislation that attempted to limit lawyers' activities altogether.
See POUND, supra note 51, at 136. This legislation sought to bar lawyers from appearing in court, limited the
number of lawyers admitted to practice and the number of courts in which the lawyers could practice, and tried
to deprive lawyers of compensation for their services. See id. at 136-38, 141; see also CHARLES WARREN, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 41-42, 53, 69, 131, 142 (1966).
53. 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE 316 (1965).
54. 1 RHODE ISLAND COLONIAL RECORDS 200-201, CODE OF 1647, at 58 (1847).
55. 3 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, at 308 (1896). Virtually identical language appears
in Delaware in 1721, in the Act for Establishing the Courts of Law and Equity Within This Government, 1 LAws
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, 1700-1797, at 133 (1797).
56. See, e.g., CHItOUST, supra note 53, at 157, 274, 314-17; John E. Douglass, Between Pettifoggers and
Professionals: Pleaders and Practitioners and the Beginnings of the Legal Profession in Colonial Maryland
1634-1731, 39Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 359, 367-68, 372-78 (1995).
57. Charles W. Wolfram, Towards a History of the Legalization of American Ethics-I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L.
ScH. ROUNDTABLE 469,474-75 (2001). A few jurisdictions provided for jury trias in discipline proceedings. Id.
at 475 n. 32. In Georgia, New York, and North Carolina, the governor also retained the right to revoke a lawyer's
license to practice. See CHROUST, supra note 53, at 157, 274.
58. See CHROUST, supra note 53, at 173-74.
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discipline process and the imposition of sanctions were largely public.59
Disbarment proceedings typically began by service of an order to show cause on
a lawyer, requiring a lawyer to show cause why he should not be disciplined.6°
Lawyers were required to present evidence like an ordinary civil litigant.
61
Courts rarely initiated discipline proceedings, but when they did so, it was by
way of a summary proceeding to disbar in contempt.62 During the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, courts received evidence in disbarment proceedings in
open court.6 3 Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals described applications to
disbar an attorney as a proceeding "of a public nature and quasi criminal." 64 Jury
trials were available in disbarment proceedings in eleven jurisdictions. 65 Courts
routinely reported the names of lawyers who had been charged with misconduct
but were not ultimately subjected to discipline.66
Judging from newspaper reports, there was great public interest in lawyer
discipline proceedings.67 It was not uncommon for newspapers to report the filing
59. One rare exception appears in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1894). In that libel case, the contents of
a petition for removal of an attorney was presented to a court clerk who -marked it "filed," but then handed it
back to the petitioner and never entered it on the docket or presented it to the court. The court noted that it was a
contempt of court to publish a pleading of one party in a newspaper "before the matter has come on to be heard."
Id. at 396. The court further stated, with respect to papers filed with the court clerk, that "we are of the opinion
that such papers are not open to public inspection." Id. It is not clear, however, whether in fact the court
documents were open to inspection at that time. Closer analysis of Massachusetts law suggests that they were as
a matter of law. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89, 91-92 (D. Mass. 1993).
60. Wolfram, supra note 57, at 474.
61. Id. at 475.
62. DAVID PAPKE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND ITS ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES: A HISTORY IN ETHIcs AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 34 (Michael Davis & Frederick Elliston eds., 1986); POUND, supra note 51, at 184-85.
63. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pagel v. Pendleton, 17 Colo. 544, 545 (1892); In re Mains, 80 N.W. 714, 715
(Mich. 1899); In re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541, 542 (N.D. 1900); In re Raisch, 90A. 12 (N.J. Ch. 1914); Hunt v.
State, 1904 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 283; In re Hilton, 158 P. 691,697 (Utah 1916); May DisbarAttorneys: Annapolis
Court Tries Lawyers Charged With Fabricating Evidence, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1911, at 3.
64. In re Kelly, 59 N.Y 595 (1875); see also In re Spencer, 122 N.YS. 190 (App. Div. 1910).
65. The U.S. Constitution does not require a jury trial in lawyer discipline proceedings. See Ex Parte Burr, 4
Fed. Cas. No. 2186 (1823). Nevertheless, some state statutes required a jury trial in certain lawyer disciplinary
proceedings. See, e.g., Ex Parte Fischer, 33 Va. 619,626 (1835) (declaring that prior to suspending a lawyer for
malpractice, he must be found guilty by a jury). At various times, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana,
Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming have afforded jury trials in
disbarment cases. Potts, supra note 50, at 170; EDwARD P. WEEKS, ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW 217
(Charles Boone ed., 2d ed. 1892). As late as 1935, lawyer respondents in disciplinary proceedings were still
entitled to a jury trial in six jurisdictions. PHILLIPS & McCoy, supra note 6, at 91 n.13.
66. See, e.g., In re Ashley, 80 P. 1030 (Cal. 1905); In re Haymond, 53 P. 899 (Cal. 1898); In re Hudson, 36 P.
812 (Cal. 1894); In re Luce, 23 P. 350 (Cal. 1890); People ex rel. The Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Robinson, 32 Colo.
241 (1904); People v. Benson, 24 Colo. 358 (1897); Zachary v. State, 43 So. 925, 926 (Fla. 1907); People ex rel.
Healy v. Thornton, 228 Ill. 42 (1907); People v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94 (1905); In re Elliott, 84 P. 750 (Kan.
1906); In re Harding, 125 N.Y.S. 264 (App. Div. 1910); In re Dunn, 50 N.Y.S. 163 (App. Div. 1898). But see
MASS. MONTHLY L. REP., Dec. 1856 (declining to provide name of respondent who was stricken from rolls of
Superior Court).
67. See, e.g., Campbell's Case, Cm. DAILY TRIB., July 17, 1884, at 2 (noting that when the proceedings to
disbar an attorney were called "[t]he court-room was crowded with attorneys, and the keenest interest
manifested"); Domestic Intelligence, COHEN'S LOTTERY GAzETTE & REG., May 23, 1822, at 66 (noting that
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of charges against lawyers in disbarment proceedings, including charges by
clients or other lawyers.68 Disciplinary proceedings were colorfully reported,69
and newspapers routinely included the names of lawyers when sanctions were
not imposed.70 Numerous public reports of pending disbarment proceedings in
several jurisdictions can be found in metropolitan newspapers during the period
from the 1870s through the early 1900s.
7 1
Beginning in the 1870s, as major bar associations started to emerge, the
associations became involved in the state lawyer discipline process.72 For
example, the Chicago Bar Association first brought a disbarment proceeding in
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas "was filled by persons anxious to ascertain what measures would be
adopted by the Court against [two lawyers]"); The Disbarment Case: The Defense Injects a Demurrer that Puts
it Off, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1888, at 1 (reporting that "[a] large crowd hung around the Supreme Court yesterday
in the expectation of seeing a good legal fight .... ).
68. See, e.g., A Charge Against An Attorney, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1877, at 2; Attempt to Disbar a Cincinnati
Attorney-The Textile Fabrics Exposition, CHI. TRm., July 29, 1869, at 1; Charge Against Lawyer: J. J. Halligan
Accused of Exacting an Exorbitant Fee, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at 12; Fellow-attorney Asks that John
Patterson be Disbarred, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1906, at 12; Motion to Disbar Attorneys, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 21,
1874, at 3; Negro Lawyer in Trouble: The Disbarment Case: The Defense Injects a Demurrer that Puts it Off,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1888, at 1; To Disbar G. R. Brewster: Newberg Lawyer Accused of Using Funds Left in His
Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1914, at 9.
69. See, e.g., An Attorneys' Fight: Horace Bell and Dunnigan & Dunnigan in Court, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1898, at 11; Attorney Attacked, Attempt to Disbar Earl Rogers, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1900, at 1118; Charge
Against Lawyer: J. J. Halligan Accused of Exacting an Exorbitant Fee, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at 12; Club
Feud, Now Suit to Disbar, CHi. TRm., May 20, 1904, at 4; The Disbarment Case: The Defense Injects a
Demurrer that Puts it Off, L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1888, at 1; Threatens to Kill Accuser if Attorneys Disbar Him,
CI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1908, at 3.
70. See, e.g., A Charge Against an Attorney, supra note 68, at 2; Charges Against Two Lawyers: Proceedings
to Disbar the Firm of Hall & Webster, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1875, at 3; Court Clears an Attorney: Appellate
Division Finds No Ground to Disbar O'Neill, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1918; Earl Rogers Vindicated, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1900, at 112; Motion to Disbar Attorneys, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 21, 1874, at 3; Proceedings to Disbar
Attorneys Dismissed, N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 1874, at p. 2.
71. See, e.g., Attorney Attacked. Attempt to Disbar Earl Rogers, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1900, at 111 8;
Campbell's Case, CHI. DAILY TRm., July 17, 1884, at 2; Judge Would Disbar Gray: Prosecutor Had Charged
Him with Unfairness in Murder Trial, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1907, at 2; Lawyer TC. Campbell: Alleged Efforts to
Prevent a Prosecution in His Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1884, at 2; Motion to Disbar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1889,
at 1; Move to Disbar J. S. Stevens: Charges Are FiledAgainst Leading Lawyer of Peoria, CHI. DAILY TRM., June
24, 1910, at 5; Moving to Disbar Bliss and Ker, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1884, at 2; Negro Lawyer in Trouble:
Fellow-attorney Asks that John Patterson Be Disbarred, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1906, at 12; Seeking to Disbar a
Lawyer William R. Martin's Connection with the Platt Estate, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1883, at 8; Seeks to Stop a
Prize Fight, CHI. TaRm., Dec. 12, 1900, at 3; The Disbarment Case: The Defense Injects a Demurrer that Puts it
Off, L.A. TMEs, Oct. 14, 1888, at 1; Threatens to Kill Accuser If Attorneys Disbar Him, C. TRm., Feb. 11,
1908, at 3; To DisbarAttorney: He Pleads Loss of Memory, L.A. TlIMES, Dec. 27,1906, at 13; To Disbar Divorce
Lawyers, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 1894, at 1; To Disbar O'Brien: Master in Chancery Cummings is Preparing a
Complaint, CI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1894, at 3.
72. Some bar associations emerged in colonial times. See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY:
LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 60-61 (1987). However, the major bar associations
that are known today were not formed until 1870 or thereafter. See MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO
PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION xiv-xv (1989).
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court against a lawyer in 1875. 7 3 The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York ("ABCNY") first investigated and pressed charges against a lawyer in
1877. 74 Bar associations initially played the role of investigators and brought
complaints to the attention of the state courts for the imposition of discipline.75
Over time, their role in the lawyer discipline process became more formalized, so
that they not only routinely investigated complaints against lawyers and held
hearings, but also made recommendations to the court about the imposition of
discipline. 6 By the early 1930s, the courts or legislatures in many states had
conferred on bar associations express authority to investigate complaints,77
subpoena power to conduct investigations, 7s and the authority to impose certain
types of discipline sanctions.7 9
When bar associations became involved in lawyer discipline, the discipline
process and the sanctions imposed became considerably more private. For
example, when the ABCNY began to investigate complaints against lawyers in
the late nineteenth century, its investigations reportedly were private. 80 The
73. See People v. Leary, 84 Ill. 190 (1876); HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR
ASSOCIATION 1874-1974, at 42 (1974).
74. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1870-1970, at 355 (1970).
75. See id. at 361; Albert P. Blaustein, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York: 1870-1951, 6 THE
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 261,265-66 (1951). The Alabama State Bar
Association had authority to institute and prosecute proceedings against attorneys in court by 1892. Weeks,
supra note 65, at 217. But not until 1909 did the Illinois Supreme Court adopt a rule that authorized any
information to be brought against an attorney by a regularly organized bar association. PHILLIPS & McCoY,
supra note 6, at 105.
76. See MARTIN, supra note 74, at 361-63. The timing of bar association involvement in the discipline
process varied considerably from state to state. For example, as late as 1912, the Chairman of the Ohio State Bar
Association Committee on Grievances stated that the "[c]ommittee has never found it necessary to even have a
meeting. If any of the members of the Ohio State Bar Association have any grievances against each other, they
have not made it known to this Committee." OHIO ST. B. Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL
SESSION 23 (1912).
77. As early as 1921, the California Legislature recognized the role of the organized bar in investigating
complaints against lawyers and bringing them to the courts. See PHIIIPS & McCoY, supra note 6, at 96-97; see
also In re Morganstem, 215 P. 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923). This role was formalized somewhat later in other
jurisdictions.
78. By 1935, grievance committees in 28 states had the power to subpoena witnesses. PHILLIPS & McCoY,
supra note 6, at 90-91.
79. See, e.g., 1 NEV. COMPILED LAWS § 565 (1929) (describing powers of the board of governors of the state
bar to disbar or suspend members or to discipline them by reproval); PHILLIPS & McCOY, supra note 6, at 100
(describing authority of California Bar Board of Governments to impose public or private reprimand, subject to
review of court); Regulation of the Practice of Law, 10 IND. L.J. 15, 16 (1934-35) (describing procedures
promulgated by Missouri Supreme Court); Rules of Procedure Regulating Disciplinary Proceedings, OKLA. ST.
B.J. 94, 95 (July 1932). But see AM. B. Ass'N, DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS: A SURVEY OF METHODS USED TO
DISCIPLINE UNETHICAL LAWYERS 42-58 (1935) [hereinafter ABA DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS SURVEY] (describ-
ing in 1935 several jurisdictions in which bar associations were not functioning in the disciplinary arena under
either statutory authority or court rule).
80. According to an official history, all grievance investigations by the bar were private. See MARTIN, supra
note 74, at 369; see also EDWARD SHELDON, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK HISTORICAL
SKETCH, PREPARED FOR THE SEMI-CENTENARY CELEBRATION 35, 76-77 (1920). However, a review of press
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ACBNY adopted procedures to keep the proceedings secret until the appointment
of a referee by the court, which came after a determination that the case
warranted prosecution.81 It reportedly fought to maintain the confidential status
of its records of an investigation as early as 1877.82 It was not until 1928,
however, that Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals ruled
that a preliminary investigation into lawyer misconduct may be private.8 3 Five
years later, the Illinois Supreme Court also adopted a rule providing that the bar
association's hearings concerning lawyer misconduct "shall be private. 84 In
1935, an ABA report stated that "[i]t is desirable that there should be no publicity
in regard to any phase of the [discipline] proceedings until it is determined by the
court that a hearing should be had when such a determination is necessary.,
85
Although it is difficult to determine the timing precisely, it appears that private
sanctions began to be imposed by state bar organizations in the 1920s.86 Courts
began imposing private discipline by the early 1930S.87 Courts and state
legislatures also started to make certain documents relating to discipline
proceedings confidential in the 1930s.88
For the next forty years, lawyer disciplinary complaints were typically handled
first by bar organizations, 89 although the courts often retained the exclusive
reports raises some question about the accuracy of this assertion. See, e.g., Charge Against Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1899, at 12.
81. See Remarks of John Proctor Clarke, ADDRESSES DELIVERED FEBRUARY 17, 1920, AND HISTORICAL
SKETCH TO COMMEMORATE THE SEMI-CENTENARY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
23-24 (1920).
82. See MARTIN, supra note 74, at 353-54.
83. Karlin v. Cuilin, 162 N.E. 487,492 (N.Y. 1928). Although Justice Cardozo noted the practice of "distant
origin by which disciplinary proceedings, unless issuing in a judgment adverse to the attorney, are recorded as
anonymous," id. at 492-93, in fact that was the exception rather than the rule up to that time.
84. PHILLIPS & McCoy, supra note 6, at 106; see also ABA DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS SURVEY, supra note
79, at 37 (noting that disciplinary hearings before the Pennsylvania State Bar were usually private).
85. ABA DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS SURVEY, supra note 79, at 5.
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6225 (1923) (providing board of commissioners with power to "take such
disciplinary action by public or private reprimand"); 1 NEV. COMPILED LAWS § 565 (1929) (providing State Bar
with power to discipline members by "reproval, public or private"); PHILLIPS & McCoY, supra note 6, at 97-98
(noting that in California from 1927 to 1939, 77 private reprovals were administered by the Board of Governors
of the State Bar); see also In re Edwards, 266 P. 665, 669 (Idaho 1928) (finding unconstitutional state statute
giving commissioners of Idaho State Bar power to impose public or private discipline). The Chicago Bar
Association reportedly asked the Illinois Supreme Court to allow the CBA to impose private admonitions even
before 1920, but it is not clear when the CBA actually obtained authority to impose private sanctions. See
HALLIDAY, supra note 72, at 77.
87. See, e.g., People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. -, Attorney at Law, 9 P.2d 611, 612 (1932); PHILLIPS &
McCoY, supra note 6, at 101 (indicating that California court imposed private discipline in 1931). It is difficult
to pinpoint the timing of this development precisely because it occurred without fanfare.
88. See, e.g., In re Integration of the Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 273 (Neb. 1937); Colo. Bar Ass'n
v. -, Attorney at Law, 9 P.2d 611 (Colo. 1932) (affirming bar's imposition of private reprimand and ordering
that the committee's report remain confidential). Some jurisdictions did not do so until the 1940s. See, e.g., N.Y.
JuD. LAW § 90, Sess. Laws of 1945, ch. 675.
89. PAPKE, supra note 62, at 29, 39. For example, in New York City, the grievance committee of the ABCNY
had considerable discretion to determine which complaints to pursue and which to dismiss. POWELL, supra note
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power to suspend or disbar.90 Most bar associations relied on volunteers,
possessed few investigative resources, and ultimately disciplined only a very
small number of lawyers about whom complaints were received. 9' Recordkeep-
ing was abysmal. For example, the responses to an ABA survey on disciplinary
procedures and practices in 1948 were so incomplete that the ensuing report
noted that "we can only accept the complete absence of disciplinary records in
those states as indicating an extraordinary disinterest on the part of the Bar and
the courts in the character and professional conduct of the practicing lawyer.,
92
Beginning in the 1960s, the organized bar came under attack, as did many
social institutions.93 The ABA took a number of defensive steps, including a
far-ranging study of bar discipline systems. In 1970, the ABA's Clark Commis-
sion concluded, after studying "all aspects of professional discipline," that bar
discipline was too self-interested, inefficient, and under-inclusive. 94 It recom-
mended that the courts resume more supervisory responsibility for overseeing
lawyer discipline.95 It also recommended the use of informal private admonitions
to insure that lawyers who were the source of complaints about minor misconduct
would receive some discipline indicating that the conduct was not condoned.96
In 1979 the ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings
recommended making disciplinary charges public after a finding of probable
cause. 97 States were not quick to adopt the ABA Standards, however, and when
the ABA's McKay Commission studied lawyer discipline systems in the early
1990s, it criticized the continued secrecy in discipline proceedings in its 1992
report. It found that no harm would come to lawyers from the public disclosure of
most discipline records and originally recommended that "all records of the
lawyer disciplinary agency, except the work product of disciplinary counsel,
72, at 20. By the 1960s, 98% of all complaints against New York City lawyers reportedly were referred initially
to the ABCNY's Grievance Committee. JEROME CARLIN, LEGAL ETHIcs: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CrrY BAR
150 (1966).
90. For instance, in California, the state bar could recommend suspension or disbarment, but only the
Supreme Court had the power to impose those sanctions. PHILIPS & McCoY, supra note 6, at 100.
91. POWELL, supra note 72, at 21; Michael J. Powell, Professional Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility
for Lawyer Discipline, 31 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 31, 37-38 (1985).
92. PHmnhLs & McCoy, supra note 6, at 94-95. According to the report, 18 states provided no response to the
questions about disciplinary action. Some other states provided incomplete responses. Id. at 94 n. 16-17.
93. See JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE tN MODERN AMERICA 263-288
(1976); PAPKE, supra note 62, at 40-41.
94. See PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS N DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3, at xiii, 1-3.
95. Id. at 24-29.
96. Id. at 92-93. The Clark Commission recommended the use of private admonitions because it was
concerned that in cases of minor misconduct, the "disciplinary agency that has no alternative but to dismiss a
complaint or prosecute a formal disciplinary proceeding will often decide to dismiss." Id. It further noted that
prosecution of a formal proceeding in an instance of minor misconduct "is unduly harsh, wastes the agency's
limited manpower and financial resources on relatively insignificant matters and... overburdens the court." Id.
at 93.
97. See ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILrrY PROCEEDINGS STD. 8.24 commentary
(1979).
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should be available to the public from the time of the complainant's initial
communication with the agency" and that all proceedings except adjudicative
deliberations should be public.98 The McKay Commission later accepted a
"friendly amendment" that the information be made public after a determination
has been made that "probable cause exists to believe that misconduct oc-
curred." 99 This approach was incorporated into the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement ("MRLDE").'00 According to the MRLDE, prior to the
filing and service of formal charges, the matter is confidential within the
agency.1 The Commentary notes that the "confidentiality that attaches prior to a
finding of probable cause and the filing of formal charges is primarily for the
benefit of the respondent, and protects against publicity predicated upon
unfounded accusations."
' 10 2
Although the MRLDE recommend that disciplinary charges be made public
after a finding of probable cause, they create an exception for "minor miscon-
duct." 10 3 In such cases, private discipline-in the form of an "admonition"-may
be imposed on a lawyer with the consent of the respondent and the approval of
the chair of a hearing committee. The admonition may not be imposed after
formal charges have been issued.1°4 According to the Commentary to the
MRLDE, a private sanction informs the lawyer that conduct is unethical but "does
not unnecessarily stigmatize a lawyer from whom the public needs no protec-
tion."' 10 5 The MRLDE continue to reflect this approach to this day.
10 6
II. LAWYER DISCIPLINE TODAY
Lawyer discipline complaints typically are submitted to a disciplinary agency
that either operates within the judicial branch or is part of an integrated state
bar.10 7 Most complaints 10 8 come from clients, from other lawyers, from third
98. See LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 5, at 34-38.
99. Id. at 33.
100. ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 16(A) (1993).
101. Id. atR. 16(B).
102. Id. at R. 16 commentary.
103. ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10(A)(5) (2001).
104. Id.
105. Id. at R. 10 commentary.
106. Id. at R. 6(A).
107. Levin, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 8, at 3-4. When the disciplinary function is handled by an
integrated state bar, the bar's authority has typically been delegated by the court. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 3-402 (2006).
108. It is important to note that jurisdictions do not use the term "complaint" in a uniform manner. Some
jurisdictions use the term "complaint" to refer to any allegations it receives about a lawyer. See, e.g., KAN. Sup.
CT. R. 209 (2005); LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX, § 11(A) (2005). Others refer to a "complaint" as being allegations that
have been docketed by the disciplinary agency after screening. See, e.g., FLA. RULES R. 3-7.3(b). Still others
refer to a "complaint" as a document that is filed only after a finding by the agency of probable cause. See, e.g.,
GA. BAR R. 4-204.4(a) (2005); IND. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR § 11 (2005). I am using "complaint" in
this section in the first sense described.
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parties, and occasionally from judges.' 0 9 Although there are important differ-
ences from state to state, the complaining party usually starts the process with a
telephone call which may be followed by a written description of the alleged
misconduct." Disciplinary agencies often use screening processes to try to
resolve misunderstandings informally and to help keep the number of docketed
complaints that require staff time low."' In addition, many disciplinary agencies
will not docket charges of incompetence against criminal defense attorneys,"
12
legal malpractice, complaints arising out of ongoing litigation,' 1 3 or many
allegations of incivility.1 14 Certain types of complaints will immediately be
referred to another agency or forum, such as bar association programs designed
to deal with fee disputes 1' 5 or advertising complaints. "16
In the remaining cases, a file will be opened and an investigation undertaken.
109. See, e.g., 2005 Annual Report of the Oregon State Bar Client Assistance Office 5 (2006), available at
http://www.osbar.org/-docs/resources/CAO-05.pdf [hereinafter Oregon State Bar Report]; Wash. State Bar
2004 Annual Report, supra note 24, at 14 (reporting that less than 1% of grievances were filed by judges); State
Bar of Ariz., Office of Lawyer Regulation: 2004 Annual Report, at 13, available at http://azbar.org/Discipline/
Reports/2004LawyerRegReport.pdf. In addition to responding to complaints about lawyer misconduct,
disciplinary agencies also impose discipline when they learn that a lawyer has been convicted of a serious crime
or has been disciplined in another jurisdiction.
110. For example, in Indiana, a complainant must file a completed form which can only be obtained by
calling the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, See Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary
Commission, Complaining About Lawyer Misconduct, http:llwww.in.gov/judiciary/discipline/complalning.
html (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). In Massachusetts, complaint forms can only be obtained by calling the
Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program. See Massachusetts Government, How to File a Complaint,
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/complant.htm#how (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
111. For example, the Florida Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program is designed to assist a consumer
in resolving problems before a complaint is filed. See FlaBar Online, Consumer Pamphlet: Attorney
Consumer Assistance Program, httpJ/ www.flabar.org/fbirFBConsum.nsf/840090c16eedaf0085256b61000928dc/
90dad2cf7a8f877b85256b2f106c6lbd?OpenDocument.
112. The rationale appears to be that in some cases, complaints may be used coercively for improper
purposes. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bar Association, Report of the MBA Task Force on Lawyer Discipline,
Protecting the Public: Reforming the Disciplinary Process (2005), at 11-13 available at http://www.massbar.org/
publications/lawyersjournal/article.php?cid=7932&vt=2. An exception may be made when the court has
already found that the lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Mary Robinson, Avoiding ARDC
Anxiety: A Disciplinary Primer, 84 ILL. B.J. 452, 453 (1996).
113. The Florida Bar, Public Information, Consumer Information, Attorney Consumer Assistance Program,
http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBConsum.nsf/840090c 16eedafOO85256b6l000928dc/90dad2cf7a8f877b852
56b2f0O6c6lbd?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Florida Bar Consumer Assistance
Program] (matters arising from ongoing litigation are outside the jurisdiction of Florida disciplinary agency).
114. Robinson, supra note 112, at 454; see also Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2002 State of the Attorney
Discipline System Report, at 101, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/annual-report02.pdf
(indicating that cases involving inappropriate language are not docketed).
115. In Virginia, for example, fee disputes are routinely dismissed by disciplinary authorities. Although the
billing of excessive fees is an ethical violation, Virginia clients have no recourse except to submit to binding
arbitration through a Fee Dispute Resolution Program sponsored by the Virginia State Bar; attorneys are not
required to submit to arbitration. Virginia State Bar, Fee Dispute Resolution Program, www.vsb.org/
feedisputes.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). Similarly, in New Jersey, grievances concerning fee disputes are
typically referred to the district fee arbitration committee. See N.J. R. 1:20-3(e)(2)(D) (2005).
116. For example, in New Jersey, a grievance concerning advertising will be referred to the Committee on
Attorney Advertising. N.J. R. 1:20-3(e)(2)(B) (2005).
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At that point, some cases will be sent to diversion programs' 1 7 or a private
sanction will be imposed. 1' 8 The cases not resolved in this fashion will either be
dismissed, or, if probable cause is found, the matter will be presented to a hearing
panel for fact finding and consideration as to whether discipline should be
imposed. "9 The panel's findings and recommendations are referred to a
disciplinary board, which reviews the panel's determinations and may administer
sanctions. 120 In many jurisdictions, the disciplinary board will then make written
recommendations which it files with the court. 21 The state court typically relies
on the findings of the hearing panel when deciding whether to accept the
recommendation of the board or to impose a different sanction.
The extent to which the disciplinary process is private varies from state to
state. Only Florida, New Hampshire, Oregon, and West Virginia treat all or most
complaints about lawyers as a matter of public record. 22 In most other states, the
complaint becomes a public record once there has been a finding of probable
cause. 123 In a minority of the jurisdictions, the public cannot attend disciplinary
117. In several jurisdictions, after some preliminary investigation, the lawyer may be offered the opportunity
to enter a diversion program if the misconduct is viewed as "minor" and there has not been a previous recent
instance of diversion. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. If the lawyer consents to diversion, he is
usually asked to enter into a "diversion" agreement. See, e.g., Mo. RuLEs R. 5.105(d); WASH. RuLEs R. 6.1. If
the lawyer successfully fulfills the requirements of the agreement, the discipline matter is terminated. See, e.g.,
MARYLAND RuLEs OF PROCEDURE R. 16-736(g) (2006); Mo. RuLEs R. 5.105(g). Diversion is not considered a
discipline sanction and is typically treated as confidential. See, e.g., ALA. RuLEs R. 8.1 (i), (k).
118. The MRLDE state that a private admonition may only be imposed before the filing of formal charges.
ABA MODEL RuLEs FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10(A)(5) (2001). As a practical matter,
however, some states have adopted variations of the MRLDE that provide for the imposition of a private
sanction after probable cause has been found. In those cases, the private sanction will usually be imposed by
disciplinary counsel, the hearing panel or the disciplinary board.
119. ABA MODEL RuLEs FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 3(D) (2001). The hearing panel is
typically composed of three individuals, two of whom are lawyers. Id. at R. 3(A).
120. See, e.g., id. at R. 2(G)(4)-(5). The board is usually composed of nine members. Id. at R. 2(B). In most
states, lawyers may be subject to private discipline, typically called an admonition or private reprimand, or
public discipline, including a public reprimand, suspension or disbarment. Levin, Emperor's Clothes, supra
note 8, at 20-23. In most jurisdictions the board can impose a public reprimand. Jurisdictions vary as to whether
the board can impose suspension or disbarment or whether those sanctions can only be imposed by the state
court.
121. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RLES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 2(G)(4) (2001).
122. Oregon treats all inquiries as public records. See OREGON STATE BAR REPORT, supra note 109, at 2.
Florida treats "complaints" as public, which means that the Florida Bar has concluded that it has jurisdiction
over a matter. Florida Bar Consumer Assistance Program, supra note 113. If bar counsel does not pursue an
inquiry or dismisses a disciplinary case, the matter becomes public, see FLA. RuLEs R. 3-7.3 (g), although this
information is only retained for one year. E-mail from Anthony Boggs, Legal Division, Florida Lawyer
Regulation, to Leslie C. Levin, (Aug. 23, 2005) (on file with author). In West Virginia, when probable cause is
not found, the investigative panel issues a brief explanatory statement, and that statement, together with the
complaint, "shall be made available to the public." W. VA. RuLEs OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE R. 2.9
(b) (2005) [hereinafter W. VA. RuLEs]. New Hampshire makes available to the public for two years all
correspondence relating to a grievance filed against a lawyer but which was not docketed as a complaint. See
N.H. Sup. CT. R. 37A (IV)(a)(2)(B) (2005).
123. However, in some states, the complaint and files may cease to be public if the lawyer is not ultimately
disciplined. See, e.g., 2006 CT. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-50 (2006); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37A (V)(e) (2005); WASH.
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hearings even after probable cause is found; information about complaints does
not become publicly available until there has been a finding of wrongdoing and a
public sanction is imposed.
1 24
All but a few jurisdictions impose private discipline, t25 and in many
jurisdictions, it is the type of discipline most often imposed.' 26 When private
discipline is imposed, the affected lawyer and complainant learn about the
discipline, but the sanction and the proceedings themselves are maintained as
confidential and typically cannot be accessed by the public. In some jurisdictions,
even the complainant is prohibited from publicizing the private discipline.
27
It is somewhat easier to learn about a lawyer's public discipline history. Notice
of public discipline is typically published in legal newspapers and sometimes in
general circulation newspapers.t18 Butin some states, consumers can only learn
about the past disciplinary history of lawyers by making a telephone call to the
court or a disciplinary agency.' 29 In other states, it is also possible to access
electronically some of the public disciplinary history of lawyers through
RuLEs R. 3.6 (b). Moreover, it can be difficult for the average meriber of the public to gain access to these public
records. In some cases, written requests for information must be made to the state discipline agency and hefty
per page charges accompany efforts to obtain relevant documents.
124. According to HALT, Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming
prohibit the public from attending discipline hearings. Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 45. In
addition, it appears that the public usually cannot attend discipline hearings in Missouri, New York and Texas.
See Mo. RULES R. 5.31; TEx. RuLES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE R. 2.16 (2005). The public can only attend a
second round of disciplinary hearings in Arkansas if there is an appeal from the initial determination. ARK.
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT R. 11 (2005).
125. Connecticut, Florida, New Hampshire, Oregon, and West Virginia impose only public discipline
sanctions and also make lesser actions accessible to the public, at least for a period of time. See, e.g., 2006 CT.
PRACTICE BOOK § 2-50 (b)(5) (2006); FLA. RULEs R. 3-7.1(a)(5); N.H. SuP. CT. R. 37(20)(b), 37A(IHI)(d)(3),
37A(IV)(a)(2)(B)-(C); OR. STATE BAR R. 1.7 (2005); W. VA. RULEs R. 2.9. A few other jurisdictions have no
private "sanctions," but use confidential "dismissals with warning," "diversion," "agreements in lieu of
discipline," or "advisory letters" for "minor" unethical conduct. D.C. BAR RULE XI, Disciplinary Proceedings
§ 17 (2005); ME. BAR R. 7. 1(d)(4)(B) (2005); N.J. R. 1:20-9(a), (c)(3) (2005); WASH. RuLEs R. 3.3 (diversion of
grievances concerning minor misconduct is confidential); see also WASH. RuLES R. 5.7 (providing that an
advisory letter may be sent to caution an attorney concerning his or her conduct but does not constitute a finding
of misconduct and is not public information).
126. For example, in 2004, Minnesota imposed private discipline in 115 cases as compared to 23 cases of
public discipline. SOLD 2004, supra note 1, at Chart II. In New York's First Department, which includes
Manhattan, 89 private sanctions were imposed as compared to 59 private sanctions. Id. In Missouri, private
discipline was imposed in 73 cases as compared to 44 cases of public sanctions. Id.
127. See, e.g., Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 45.
128. The MRLDE expressly encourages this practice. ABA MODEL RuLEs OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT R. 17(B) (2001).
129. See, e.g., Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm., Getting Information About Lawyers, www.in.gov/
judiciary/discipline/information.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006) (requiring toll call to clerk's office to obtain
information); Oregon State Bar, Ethics Complaints and Lawyer Discipline, http://www.osbar.org/public/legalinfo/
1174.htm#ethics (last visited Nov. 28, 2006) (requiring toll call in Oregon).
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disciplinary agency or judicial websites t3 ° Unfortunately, the disciplinary
histories on websites often only go back to the mid-to-late- 1990s. In addition, the
websites do not always indicate the reason why discipline was imposed.131 In
some jurisdictions, even "public" discipline will disappear from public view after
a specified period of time.
1 32
In addition, many state lawyer discipline agencies publish "annual reports,"
but they are often not a particularly rich source of information. They usually
report how many discipline "complaints" were docketed, in how many cases
discipline was imposed, the identities of members of the disciplinary agency, and
how much funding the agency received.1 33 The more informative reports also
provide information about the types of misconduct alleged, the sources of the
complaints, and the types of practice specialities or practice settings in which the
attorneys worked. 134 However, these reports typically do not provide information
about the actual number of complaints received by the agency, the types of cases
that are resolved through private sanctions, the number or types of cases resolved
through diversion, or the race or law office setting of the lawyers who are subject
to discipline.1
35
III. TmE PUBLIC POLICY CASE FOR MORE TRANSPARENCY
As discussed above, in most jurisdictions, the discipline process is confidential
from the time that an individual complainant contacts the discipline agency until
and unless probable cause is found. Indeed, even after a probable cause
determination, the public may be unable to determine that a lawyer is defending
against serious charges of unethical conduct because discipline proceedings in
some jurisdictions remain private unless and until a public sanction is imposed.
Since most of these matters are handled informally, dismissed, or resolved
through private sanctions or diversion, information about most of the 125,000-
plus complaints against lawyers each year is entirely confidential. Not only does
this mean that the public at large has few means available to observe and evaluate
130. See, e.g., State of Conn., Judicial Branch, Grievance Committee, Grievance Decisions, http://
www.jud.ct.gov/SGC/decisions/default.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006); Wash. State Bar Ass'n Discipline
Notice Search, http://pro.wsba.org/PublicDisciplineSearch.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2006).
131. For example, the websites in Washington and Illinois list that discipline was imposed on a lawyer, but
do not indicate the reasons for the discipline and it is not possible to access the relevant disciplinary decisions
from the website.
132. See, e.g., Mo. RuLEs R. 5.31(d) (letter of admonition available to public only for three years); WASH.
RuLEs R. 3.6 (b) (records of admonitions, which are initially public, may be destroyed after five years).
133. Some provide considerably less information. For example, Connecticut publishes no annual report that
is available to the public. Some jurisdictions, like Florida and South Carolina, publish a few statistics with no
accompanying explanation.
134. See, e.g., 2003 ARDC Report, supra note 39; 2004 N.J. Discipline System Report, supra note 17.
135. There are a few exceptions. For example, California and Georgia make an effort to track the number of
contacts with the agency. The Illinois ARDC has occasionally compiled information about minority lawyers.
See supra note 39.
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the process of lawyer discipline, but also that individual consumers have no way
to determine whether their own lawyers have received private discipline
sanctions or have entered into diversion agreements.
When considering whether more transparency in the handling of lawyer
discipline complaints is desirable, it is important to weigh the arguments for a
confidential discipline process and the private disposition of complaints 13 6
against the benefits of a more transparent discipline process. But because the
relative weight of these interests shifts during the progress of a disciplinary
matter, t 37 it is useful to try to identify the particular point in the discipline process
at which the interest in confidentiality-which is not inconsiderable-might give
way to more transparency. As noted earlier, the McKay Commission originally
fixed this point at the time when the initial complaint was received, proposing
that "all records of the lawyer disciplinary agency should be public from the time
of the complainant's initial communication with the agency." 138 The ABA
rejected this approach, and its MRLDE suggest that the interest in transparency
outweighs confidentiality only after probable cause is found and only in cases
involving more than "minor" misconduct. 139
I suggest that more discipline information should be open to public scrutiny by
fixing the point at which information is disclosed at an earlier point in the
process. I would not fix this point where the McKay Commission did because
many initial inquiries to disciplinary agencies are made by people who do not
have cognizable complaints, 140 and thus a fully open process would not be fair to
lawyers. I do, however, suggest that the public's right to information should vest
once a discipline complaint is docketed and that the information should become
available once that complaint is dismissed, resolved informally (through minor
sanction or diversion), 14 1 or referred for further proceedings after a probable
cause determination. Close analysis suggests that the interests in transparency at
this point in the process outweigh the interests in confidentiality.
A. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR KEEPING DISCIPLINE PRIVATE
(1) Fairness and Reputational Concerns. A significant reason for keeping the
136. I am using the term "private disposition" here and throughout this article to mean both disposition
through private sanctions and disposition through diversion, which is typically also maintained as confidential.
137. In other words, many of the arguments supporting confidentiality are strongest at the beginning of the
discipline process and weaken as the proceeding progresses toward a final resolution against the attorney.
138. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. The McKay Commission later accepted a "friendly
amendment" to its proposal after opposition from the ABA House of Delegates. See LAWYER REGULATION FOR A
NEW CENTURY, supra note 5, at 35.
139. ABA MODEL RuLES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10 commentary (2001); see also ABA
MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 16(A) (1993).
140. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
141. What this means, as a practical matter, is that there would be no private sanctions or confidential
diversions.
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discipline process private is fairness to the attorneys. 42 Most complaints are
ultimately dismissed and attorneys fear that the publication of baseless com-
plaints would unfairly damage lawyers' reputations. 43 This argument has
considerable force. Clients sometimes complain to disciplinary agencies simply
because they do not like the results achieved or the final bill. Some clients have
unrealistic expectations of what their lawyers can do for them and as a result, will
attempt to file a complaint. Opposing lawyers will sometimes make disciplinary
complaints to obtain an advantage in ongoing litigation.
Lawyers are very concerned about their reputations, and as the McKay
Commission noted, "a lawyer's reputation is not only the basis for his or her
livelihood, it is a cherished and integral part of the lawyer's life."' 44 The MRLDE
drafters recognized that there was some unfairness inherent in the publicity of
unfounded charges and concluded that the discipline process should be secret
until a finding of probable cause. Their decision reflected an effort to accommo-
date the public's interest in open proceedings, on the one hand, against fairness to
the charged attorneys on the other. They reasoned that "[o]nce a finding of
probable cause has been made, there is no longer a danger that the allegations
against the respondent are frivolous., 1 4 5 As the MRLDE Commentary explains,
"[t]he need to protect the integrity of the disciplinary process in the eyes of the
public requires that at this point further proceedings be open to the public."
'' 46
Fairness arguments in support of confidentiality admittedly become more
compelling earlier in the discipline process, such as when a docketed complaint is
dismissed. But if the information about the docketed complaint is coupled with a
report that it was dismissed, this somewhat ameliorates fairness concerns.
Proponents of an open disciplinary process have pointed to the fact that Oregon,
West Virginia, and Florida have made discipline complaints available for several
years with "no evidence" of any harm to lawyers.1 47 Nevertheless, this claim
appears too facile. In fact, there has been no systematic effort to study whether
142. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 16 commentary (2001)
("The confidentiality that attaches prior to a finding of probable cause and the filing of formal charges is
primarily for the benefit of the [attorney], and protects against publicity predicated upon unfounded
accusations.").
143. Fairness and reputational concerns are not completely co-extensive. Obviously, they are closely linked
when a lawyer suffers injury because he is wrongly charged with misconduct. While reputational concerns still
exist when a lawyer has been found to have engaged in misconduct, there is considerably less of a "fairness"
concern about publicizing the misconduct.
144. LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 5, at 38; see also Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487,
492 (N.Y. 1928) ("Reputation... is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.");
In re Aretakis, 791 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (App. Div. 2005).
145. ABA MODEL RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 16 commentary (2001).
146. Id.
147. The McKay Commission noted, "There is no evidence from those states of any harm to lawyers from
making disciplinary records public. The arguments against open disciplinary systems are based on conjecture
and emotion." LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 5, at 35; see also Steven K. Berensen, Is it
Time for Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FORDH -I L. REv. 645,681(2001).
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the open discipline process has damaged the reputations of innocent lawyers.148
The more compelling point is comparative. Claims that it is "unfair" to disclose
dismissed complaints are difficult to sustain when the contents of civil
complaints, police arrest blotters, and criminal preliminary hearings are open
records and proceedings. 1
49
The fairness arguments in support of confidentiality have even less force when
applied to private sanctions and confidential diversion programs. The MRLDE
endorse the use of private sanctions in cases "of minor misconduct, when there is
little or no injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession, and
when there is little likelihood of repetition by the lawyer.. .. ""t The justifica-
tion explicitly relies on reputational considerations, as the MRLDE commentary
notes that "[a] private sanction in those cases informs the lawyer that his or her
conduct is unethical but does not unnecessarily stigmatize a lawyer .... In
other words, when private discipline is imposed, a lawyer has been found to have
engaged in misconduct, but his reputation is protected on the theory that the
lawyer is not someone from whom the public needs protection. 152 There is no
evidence, however, that disciplinary counsel or hearing boards-which typically
impose private sanctions-are capable of determining whether the lawyer is
likely to engage in similar misconduct in the future. 153 Moreover, in the case of
private sanctions and diversion, the lawyer typically admits to misconduct and
there is nothing inherently "unfair" about making this information public so long
as the lawyer did not consent to the disposition believing it would be kept
private. 15
4
(2) Integrity of Investigative Process. In most challenges to confidential lawyer
discipline proceedings, courts consider bar arguments that confidentiality pro-
148. This would admittedly be difficult to prove. In the absence of evidence, some courts have assumed that
lawyers' reputations are seriously harmed by baseless charges. See, e.g., Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Super. Ct., 354
P.2d 637, 648 (Cal. 1960) ("The fact that a charge has been made against an attorney, no matter how guiltless the
attorney might be, if generally known, would do the attorney irreparable harm even though he be cleared by the
State Bar.").
149. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino,
380 F.3d 83, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2004); Caledonian Record Publ'g Co. v. Walton, 573 A.2d 296 (Vt. 1990);
Newspapers, Inc. v. Metropolitan Police Dep't, 546 A.2d 990 (D.C. 1988); Newspapers Inc. v. Breier, 279
N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1979).
150. ABA MODEL RULES LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10(A)(5) (2001).
151. Id. atR. 10 commentary.
152. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS STD. 2.6 commentary (1991).
153. Indeed, even mental health professionals have great difficulty predicting future conduct. See, e.g., P.
Firestone, et al., Recidivism in Convicted Rapists, 26 J. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 185 (1998); Rachel Lipson
Glick, et al., Emergency Psychiatry: How Should Emergency Psychiatrists Respond to School Violence?, 55
PSYCHIATRY SERV. 223 (2004).
154. Where minor misconduct is involved, there would be reputational arguments for not widely publicizing
this information, even if it is open for public inspection. The question of whether this information should be
broadly disseminated-or simply available if requested-is a difficult one that merits serious consideration.
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tects the integrity of the investigative process.15 According to this argument,
complainants and witnesses may not come forward if their complaints and
testimony are going to be known publicly.' 56 For instance, clients may be
deterred by a more public discipline process from revealing information about
lawyer misconduct, 157 presumably because they do not wish to reveal they have
been duped by their own lawyer, they do not wish to reveal certain client
confidences, or they fear that the lawyer will reveal confidential client informa-
tion under the self-defense exception to client confidentiality rules. In some
cases, bar counsel also argue that confidentiality is needed because investigations
into alleged unethical activity will be impaired by premature publicity.
Most courts that have considered arguments concerning the integrity of the
investigative process have noted that there does not seem to be empirical support
for these claims. 158 It is, in fact, difficult to measure the deterrent effect, if any,
that a more public discipline process may have on an individual's willingness to
make a complaint or a witness's willingness to come forward. But it does not
appear that the complaint statistics in West Virginia, which makes complaints
publicly available after they are dismissed, are much different than the complaint
statistics in Iowa or Maryland, which maintain confidentiality until a sanction is
imposed.' 59 This is unsurprising. Anyone who brings a complaint to a disciplin-
ary agency presumably recognizes that if the complaint is found meritorious,
there is some likelihood that at least some of the information will become public.
The only questions are how much information will become public and at what
point in the process this will occur. In addition, the investigative integrity
argument is not especially strong with respect to witnesses, who can be
155. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Tenn. 2004); Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics,
326 S.E.2d 705, 709 (W. Va. 1984).
156. See Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 E Supp. 981, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Brooks, 678 A.2d 140, 144 (N.H.
1996); Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d at 735-36.
157. See, e.g., In re Aretakis, 291 N.Y.S.2d. 687, 688 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that a policy of keeping
records relating to disciplinary complaint confidential until finally determined "serves the purpose of
safeguarding information that a potential complainant may regard as private or confidential and thereby
removes a possible disincentive to the filing of complaints of professional misconduct"); Sadler v. Or. State Bar,
550 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Or. 1976) (noting the Bar's argument that "individuals might not feel so free to complain if
they knew their complaints might be made public").
158. See, e.g., Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 F. Supp. at 985 (discussing the State Bar's argument that confidentiality
encourages the filing of complaints and the cooperation of witnesses); Sadler, 550 P.2d at 1221 (discussing the
State Bar's argument that "individuals might not feel so free to complain if they knew their complaints might be
made public"). But see Daily Gazette Co., 326 S.E.2d at 712 (noting that public disclosure of facts regarding a
complaint prior to the filing of formal charges can impair the State Bar's investigatory function).
159. In fact, proportionally more complaints are received in West Virginia than in Iowa or Maryland. For
example, during 2004, there were 5,583 lawyers with active licenses in West Virginia, and 663 disciplinary
complaints were received. In Iowa there were 8,342 active lawyers and 641 complaints received. In Maryland
there were 31,934 active lawyers and 2,095 complaints received. 2004 SOLD, supra note 1, Chart I. Admittedly
the comparison is imperfect because "complaints" may be reported differently in these jurisdictions and there
may be other factors at work. But in any event, the administrative argument about deterring complaints seems
unsupported by the available data.
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subpoenaed to give evidence in connection with investigations, 160 regardless of
their preferences with respect to secrecy. Any concern about protecting the
integrity of the investigation is much less compelling after a finding of probable
cause, when the investigation is essentially complete.1 6  And of course, the
concern that confidentiality is needed to protect the integrity of the process does
not apply with any real force once the decision to impose a sanction is made.
162
(3) Administrative Efficiency. Another argument for keeping lawyer discipline
confidential-at least where "minor" misconduct is involved-is administrative
efficiency. In many jurisdictions private dispositions of misconduct do not
require formal disciplinary charges and can be disposed of relatively easily
without a finding of probable cause, a hearing, or the involvement of the court.163
If the private handling of "minor" misconduct were eliminated, streamlined
procedures that have been put in place for dealing with these matters might no
longer be used, resulting in more demands on state discipline systems. According
to this argument, lawyers may be less willing to forego a hearing and consent to
an admonition or diversion if they know the matter will be public.
164
Of course, streamlined procedures can be and are used in some jurisdictions
for the imposition of public admonitions on consent, reducing the strain on state
systems. 165 It is also possible that lawyers will still settle on consent to resolve
discipline complaints quickly and in order to get the lightest possible form of
public discipline. The experiences in Florida and Oregon suggest that even in
jurisdictions with exclusively public discipline sanctions and public diversion,
lawyers will consent to these dispositions. It is less clear whether the administra-
tive efficiency of discipline systems in the very largest jurisdictions will be
adversely affected if many lawyers refuse to consent to discipline because the
sanctions are not private.
(4) Reluctance to Publicly Sanction Minor Misconduct. Although not explictly
argued by the bar, another reason that arguably justifies the private treatment of
"minor" misconduct is lawyers' reluctance to publicly sanction such misconduct.
160. Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d at 735. Of course, it can be argued that witnesses may be less likely to come
forward if they cannot do so confidentially but there is, at the present time, no empirical support for this claim.
161. See id. at 736.
162. In the unusual case where an individual may not want to reveal personal information in order to protect
his or her identity or privacy, the court can order that the individual's identity not be revealed without requiring
that a private sanction be imposed.
163. See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DIscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(C) (2001).
164. See generally Kamasinski v. Judicial Rev. Council, 44 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering similar
argument in the judicial discipline context); In re Brooks, 678 A.2d 140, 145 (N.H. 1996) (noting that attorneys
may be less willing to consent to discipline if the sanction is not private, but that this gain in efficiency did not
outweigh the First Amendment concerns in that case); In re Johnson, 461 N.W.2d 767, 769 (S.D. 1990)
(considering argument that disclosure of affidavit may prolong time-consuming disciplinary litigation and
discourage disbarment by consent proceedings).
165. For example, in Oregon, if the Professional Responsibility Board determines that an admonition is
appropriate and the lawyer consents, the admonition may be imposed without a finding of probable cause or the
filing of a formal complaint. OR. STATE BAR R. 2.6; 3.6 (2005).
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When the Clark Commission reviewed lawyer discipline systems, it recom-
mended the vesting of private admonitory power in all disciplinary agencies
because it found that "minor" misconduct was not being sanctioned. 166 The
Commission noted that "[tihe disciplinary agency that has no alternative but to
dismiss a complaint or prosecute a formal disciplinary proceeding will often
decide to dismiss."' 16 7 While the cost of using the formal discipline apparatus for
"minor" misconduct was part of the concern, so was the view that "[p]rosecution
of a formal disciplinary proceeding predicated on an instance of minor
misconduct is unduly harsh."1 68 Thus, the concern was that if private admoni-
tions were not available, there might be a greater reluctance to sanction "minor"
misconduct because it would be publicly reported.
It may be true that lawyers on disciplinary hearing panels find it difficult to
impose a public sanction on a lawyer who has committed only "minor"
misconduct. But this fact may simply reflect a problem with having lawyers sit on
the hearing committees, rather than a problem with the use of public discipline
per se. 16 9 If lawyers are squeamish about imposing minor public sanctions on
other lawyers, the answer may be to have more laypersons involved in the
discipline process.
(5) Rehabilitation of Lawyers. Another occasionally cited justification for
confidential discipline proceedings-and for confidential sanctions-is that they
promote the rehabilitation of lawyers.1 70 This is a justification of relatively recent
origin; when the Clark Commission proposed the use of private admonitions for
minor misconduct in 1970, it made no reference to the rehabilitative function of
private admonitions. 171 While there are no studies supporting the view that
confidentiality is needed to insure rehabilitation, there is some limited anecdotal
support for the view that lawyers experience even minor disciplinary proceedings
as emotionally debilitating and that such an experience may make lawyers more
alienated and less likely to initiate preventative procedures in their practices.172
Research would be required to test whether there is in fact any connection
between discipline and a failure to institute preventive procedures-and whether
it matters that such discipline is public or private-before reaching any
conclusions about the strength of rehabilitation as a rationale for the private
166. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3, at 92.
167. Id. at 92-93.
168. Id. at 93.
169. As previously noted, hearing panels are comprised primarily of lawyers. See supra note 119; see also
Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 45 (noting that six states have no non-lawyers on hearing panels and
that Idaho is the only state in which non-lawyers comprise the majority on the hearing panels).
170. See McLaughlin v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 348 A.2d 376, 381 (Pa. 1974).
171. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3, at 92-96. Prior to that
time, courts showed relatively little interest in the rehabilitative function of lawyer discipline. See, e.g., Resner
v. State Bar of Cal., 349 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1960) (stating in proceeding to review recommendation of disbarment,
"[w]e are not, in this proceeding, concerned with rehabilitation").
172. Ellis, supra note 18, at 1230.
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treatment of misconduct.
The more difficult question arises from the increasing interplay between
Lawyer Assistance Programs, which are designed to help lawyers with psycho-
logical and substance abuse problems, and diversion. Lawyer Assistance
Programs routinely offer lawyers confidentiality to encourage them to seek out
and effectively use counseling services.1 73 As an increasing number of lawyers
are required to participate in Lawyer Assistance Programs as a condition of
diversion, difficult questions arise as to how much information can or should be
revealed to the public about these referrals. At the present time, lawyers
frequently raise their psychological problems in lawyer discipline proceedings as
a defense or in mitigation of misconduct. 174 This occurs even in jurisdictions
where the proceedings are made public after a finding of probable cause. It seems
probable that so long as disclosure of these problems helps lawyers avoid
discipline sanctions, many lawyers will not be deterred from raising their
psychological problems in disciplinary proceedings. It cannot be predicted with
complete confidence, however, that self-disclosure of psychological problems
will never be inhibited by a lack of secrecy earlier in the process, at the point
where diversion agreements typically are discussed. This potential problem need
not, however, be addressed by maintaining total secrecy concerning the lawyer's
misconduct. Instead, the problem could be addressed by reporting the fact that the
lawyer has entered into a diversion agreement, but not revealing that the
diversion involved referral to a Lawyer Assistance Program for the purpose of
addressing psychological or substance abuse problems.
(6) The Reputation of the Bar. A final reason that has been advanced for
keeping the discipline process and discipline sanctions confidential is protection
of the reputation of the Bar. The thrust of this argument is that confidentiality
avoids the loss of confidence in the Bar caused by complaints against lawyers,
frivolous or otherwise. Most courts have rejected this argument.175 As will be
seen below, they have concluded that a secret process and secret sanctions are
more harmful than helpful to the Bar's reputation.
173. See, e.g., Oregon Attorney Assistance Program, Notice of Privacy Practices, http://www oaap.org/
index.asp?page=privacy (last visited Nov. 25, 2006).
174. See Levin, Emperr's Clothes, supra note 8, at 24-25; Alex Gronke, The State: Assembly OKs
Bar-Funded Rehab for Lawyers, L.A. TIMAEs, June 22, 2001, at B8 ("30% to 40% of the [California] bar's
discipline cases involve substance abuse in some way"). But see Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons,
Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 785, 835 (2004) (noting that in
only 143 of the 3,493 cases in their database, the disciplined attorney offered, as a mitigating factor, alcoholism,
drug abuse, depression, and other mental health issues).
175. As more than one court has noted, confidentiality is more likely to engender resentment and suspicion
than to protect the reputation of the bar. Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 F Supp. 981,987 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Doe v. Doe, 127
S.W.3d 728, 734-35 (Tenn. 2004). But see McLaughlin, 348 A.2d at 381.
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B. THE ARGUMENTS FOR A MORE OPEN DISCIPLINE PROCESS
(1) Consumer Protection. One of the two main arguments for opening up the
lawyer discipline process and eliminating the private disposition of misconduct is
protection of the public. Horror stories abound about clients who were defrauded
by their lawyers while those same lawyers were under investigation by
disciplinary counsel in other discipline cases. 76 If clients were able to access
information about complaints docketed against their lawyers, clients might then
more carefully scrutinize how the lawyers were representing them.
The likelihood that consumers would be better protected if all discipline
sanctions and most diversion were made public is significant. While it is possible
that attorneys who receive one private admonition will never find themselves
before a disciplinary board again, that is often not the case. Indeed, many clients
are victimized by lawyers who had previously received more than one private
sanction. 177 In addition, it is highly unlikely that private admonitions or diversion
work as a general deterrent-because most lawyers never learn of them-and
there is little evidence that they work as a specific deterrent. Thus, if consumers
could find out which lawyers have been found to have engaged in minor
misconduct and the details of the misconduct, they would be in a position to
better determine whether they need to take steps to protect themselves from
certain lawyers.
(2) Public Confidence. The other main argument for a more transparent lawyer
discipline process is to promote more confidence in the lawyer discipline system.
As one court has observed, "if the legal profession's practice of self-regulation is
to remain viable, the public must be able to observe for themselves that the
process is impartial and effective. We cannot simply expect the public to blindly
accept that justice is being done."1 78 A lawyer discipline process in which only
public discipline is imposed might also generate more public confidence in a
system which is seen as secret and overly protective of lawyers. 179 Although most
states include lay representatives on disciplinary hearing boards, the public
members are typically in the minority.1 80 The public and the media understand-
ably suspect a process they often cannot observe and cannot review even after the
process has been concluded.' 81 By opening the process and making sanctions
public, the general public is more likely to view the disciplinary system as fair
176. See, e.g., Thomas D. Williams, Disciplining Bad Lawyers A Long, Slow Process; and While State Panel
Deliberates, Questionable Attorneys Continue to Practice, HARTFORD CouANT, Mar. 7, 2004, at Al.
177. See supra notes 6, 8-9 and accompanying text.
178. Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics, 326 S.E.2d 705,711 (W. Va. 1984) (emphasis in original).
179. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 119.
181. See Daily Gazette Co., 326 S.E.2d at 365-66; see also Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 F. Supp. 981, 988 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (noting that continuing confidentiality after a grievance is found meritorious "is far more likely to
engender suspicion than foster confidence"); see also Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 45; Kay A.
Ostberg, The Conflict of Interest in Lawyer Self-Regulation, THE PROF. LAW., Summer 1989, at 8 (noting that
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and legitimate.
(3) Public Input. If the disciplinary process were more transparent, the public
could provide more input into how it is conducted. For example, when low-level
public sanctions are imposed for certain misconduct, a negative public reaction
might cause decisionmakers to more carefully consider the public's concerns
about certain types of lawyer misconduct. Indeed, if all sanctions and dismissals
were public, any difficulty that lawyer-members of disciplinary boards might
have with imposing discipline for "minor" misconduct would undoubtedly be
balanced against the fact that the public could be observing-and reacting
to-the sanctions imposed. Moreover, if the public knew more about what was
happening in terms of lawyer discipline, its response might encourage closer
oversight of the disciplinary process by the legislature and the judiciary. It seems
fair to assume that if the public could more closely observe the way in which
complaints against lawyers are handled and resolved, the disciplinary system
would become much more consumer-oriented than it currently is in most
jurisdictions.182
(4) Complainant's Feelings. A system of private discipline and private
sanctions largely disregards the feelings of clients who believe they have been
wronged by their lawyers. The vast majority of complaints about lawyer
misconduct come from clients, but when the discipline process fails to address a
complaint, or addresses it in a private fashion, this likely compounds the injury
from the client's perspective. 183 Imagine, for example, a client whose lawyer was
found to have engaged in serious neglect that prejudiced the client, but who
received a private sanction. In many jurisdictions, that client is prevented by
court rules from appealing the sanction and in some jurisdictions, from even
communicating the existence of the private sanction to anyone else.' 4 It is
therefore not surprising that in some cases clients have contemplated risking
contempt of court to publicize the lawyer's wrongdoing and the disciplinary
"self-policing has led to overprotecting of lawyers, manifested in a process that is secret, slow and overly
lenient").
182. Defenders of a more secret discipline process might argue that the public should not have any
significant input because the public is not equipped to evaluate lawyer behavior or the disciplinary process.
According to this argument, the issues are complex and the lawyers' ethical obligations demand a very careful
weighing of conduct that occurs in a very pressured environment. This argument does not, however, address the
fact that secret processes and secret discipline prevent the public from even expressing an educated view about
how lawyer discipline is conducted and the sanctions imposed, wholly apart from the question of who actually
makes the determination of what the appropriate sanction should be in any given case.
183. Indeed, disputants care a great deal about the perceived fairness of the dispute resolution process.
Studies reveal that "perceptions of procedural justice influence disputants' perceptions of substantive justice,
their compliance with the outcomes reached in dispute resolution processes and their perceptions of the
legitimacy of the institution that provided or sponsored the dispute resolution process." Nancy A. Welsh,
Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural
Justice, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 179, 184-85 (2002).
184. See Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 45.
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system's response--or the inadequacy of the response."'
(5) Increased Information for Disciplinary Authorities. If the disciplinary
process were more open, it would probably increase the availability of useful
information about lawyer misconduct. For example, former clients who learn of
docketed complaints against their lawyers might step forward to complain of
similar misconduct by the lawyers. This information could help notoriously
under-financed disciplinary investigators develop evidence of a pattern of
misconduct, which typically can provide a basis for increasing a lawyer's
disciplinary sanctions.1 86 It might also cause agencies to pursue matters against
lawyers whom they otherwise viewed as one-time offenders and to better
evaluate whether a low-level disposition is truly appropriate in particular cases.
(6) The Use of Precedent. Ironically, private discipline sanctions can hurt other
lawyers who are charged with misconduct. If discipline sanctions are private, the
facts of those cases are not available to be used by other lawyers as precedent in
their own cases. This may particularly disadvantage solo and small law firm
practitioners, who often represent themselves in disciplinary proceedings and
may not have the resources to track down the facts of individual cases and find
cases similar to their own. 187 Private discipline may also result in a lack of
consistency in decisionmaking, 188 unless disciplinary counsel or hearing panels
take it upon themselves to thoroughly research the sanctions imposed in similar
cases.
(7) Research. Disciplinary agencies lack the resources and, in some cases, the
will to maintain information in a systematic fashion that enables them to track the
effectiveness of their work. In some states, information about the time required to
resolve complaints is not maintained, apparently so that the disciplinary agency
does not face criticism. Bar counsel do not maintain information relating to
recidivism among lawyers who had been previously disciplined, although some
counsel have admitted privately that it would be a good idea to do so.1 89 The use
of exclusively public sanctions and the opening of diversion records would
permit the tracking of recidivism and reveal other important information. If
discipline records were open, more research could be done to answer the
questions raised in the Introduction of this article and many other important
185. See, e.g., Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 F Supp. at 983.
186. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCrTONS STD. 9.22 (c)-(d) (1991).
187. At least one court has taken the view that the bar was required to produce information about confidential
disciplinary proceedings in similar cases. See Brotsky v. State Bar of Cal., 368 P.2d 697, 706 (Cal. 1962). But
other courts have taken a much more restrictive view of lawyers' rights to discovery in discipline cases.
Moreover, the right to discovery only arises once probable cause is found, so that the lack of access to precedent
will disadvantage lawyers who may be deciding whether to consent to a sanction before a finding of probable
cause.
188. See generally Cincinnati Post v. Ct. App., 604 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ohio 1992) (noting that inconsistent
results "can be analyzed and challenged only if decisions are made public").
189. See supra note 8.
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questions relating to the efficacy and fairness of lawyer discipline. 190
IV. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR LESS SECRECY IN LAWYER DISCIPLINE
In most states, the courts adopt rules governing the procedures to be used in
lawyer discipline proceedings, as well as the types of discipline that can be
imposed. Either the courts or the legislatures determine which procedures and
records will be confidential and which information will be open to the public.191
There have been relatively few legal challenges to these confidentiality require-
ments. In this section, I describe relevant case law and explore possible legal
bases for arguing that the public has a right of access to lawyer discipline
proceedings and to certain discipline records. In doing so, I do not mean to
suggest that steady litigation is the best or quickest way to open the discipline
system up to the public; rather, this section simply explores ways to make some
headway towards greater transparency in the disciplinary process within the
framework of current law.
A. THE LAWYER DISCIPLINE CASE LAW
Challenges to rules keeping lawyer discipline confidential have principally
arisen in two types of cases. In the first type of case, courts have considered
challenges to rules that prevent complainants from publicizing the fact that they
have made a complaint about a lawyer to state discipline agencies. In the second,
courts have considered right of access claims by which accused lawyers, the
media, or other interested parties have sought to attend lawyer disciplinary
hearings or to obtain confidential discipline records.
190. While disciplinary agencies arguably could maintain and report this information rather than make their
records public, this would not be the ideal approach, nor is it likely to occur. The numbers and analysis will
always be suspect if provided by people whose own systems are being evaluated. Moreover, the research
performed or commissioned to date by those "within" the system has had some significant limitations. See supra
notes 27, 40-43 and accompanying text. From a practical perspective, too, it is unlikely that this information
could be compiled and reported by the agencies. Disciplinary agencies are notoriously underfunded and
understaffed. See, e.g., Neil Modie, Stricter Policing of Lawyers Urged: Discipline by Court, Not Bar
Proposed, SEArrLE PosT INTELUGENcER, Jan. 12, 1994, at BI (reporting lack of money and personnel as the
biggest problem in the state's disciplinary system); see also California High Court Imposes Additional Fee on
Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1998, at B28 (describing underfunding of discipline in California); Rep./Bull.:
Report of the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, J. Mo. B. Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 266, 269 (reporting that the
disciplinary agency was too understaffed to pursue volume of unauthorized practice of law complaints it
received). They lack the resources to track and compile important information like recidivism rates on a regular
basis.
191. For example, in California and New York the confidentiality of discipline records is provided by statute.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.1 (Deering 2005); N.Y. JuD. LAW § 45 (McKinney 2005). In many other
states, confidentiality is prescribed by court rule. See, e.g., Mo. RULES R. 12.21(a); PA. Rutrs OF DiscnwLARY
ENFORCEMENT R. 402 (2005).
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1. CHALLENGES TO RULES THAT PREVENT COMPLAINANTS FROM DISCLOSING INFORMATION
The courts that have considered challenges to court rules preventing complain-
ants from discussing their complaints about lawyers have struck down such rules
on First Amendment grounds. For example, in Doe v. Supreme Court of
Florida,192 a federal district court struck down as unconstitutional a Florida rule
that required complainants to keep confidential information about lawyer
complaints or face the prospect of being held in contempt of court. The
complainant in Doe challenged the rule after his complaint against the lawyer had
been found to be meritorious. The federal court found that the state bar was
unable to come forward with a compelling interest to justify the content-based
restriction. It noted that "imposing an enforced silence on all aspects of Bar
disciplinary matters-including investigations, probable cause hearings, and
final dispositions-is more likely, in our view, to engender resentment, suspicion,
and contempt for Florida's Bar and its legal institutions than to promote integrity,
confidence, and respect."'193 Relying on the United States Supreme Court
decision in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,194 in which the Court
struck down a Virginia statute that subjected persons to criminal sanctions for
divulging information regarding confidential judicial misconduct proceedings, 9 5
the Doe court also found that insofar as the Florida confidentiality rule was
designed to protect the reputation of the Florida Bar, there was no justification for
it once the grievance was found to be meritorious. 196 Since then, the Supreme
Courts of New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Tennessee have found unconstitu-
tional similar state court rules requiring confidentiality in the lawyer discipline
context. 197
2. CHALLENGES TO RULES THAT PREVENT ACCESS TO LAWYER DIsCIPLINE
HEARINGS OR RECORDS
Relatively few courts have considered legal attempts to open up the lawyer
192. 734 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
193. Id. at 987.
194. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
195. In Landmark, a newspaper was indicted for violating a Virginia criminal statute after it reported on a
pending inquiry by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission concerning a state judge before a
formal complaint was filed. The United States Supreme Court specifically noted that it was not considering the
state's power to keep the Commission's proceedings confidential or whether there was any constitutionally
compelled right to access for the press to those proceedings. Id. at 837-38. It found, however, that the interest in
maintaining the reputation of judges or the institutional integrity of the courts was insufficient to justify the
punishment of speech in that case, where First Amendment rights were at stake. Id. at 842-43.
196. Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 F. Supp. 981,988 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
197. See In re Brooks, 678 A.2d 140 (N.H. 1996); R.M. v. Sup. Ct., 883 A.2d 369 (N.J. 2005); Doe v. Doe,
127 S.W.3d 728, 735 (Tenn. 2004).
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discipline process or discipline records. 198 Efforts to obtain lawyer discipline
records based on state open records laws have had mixed results and have turned
on the precise language and history of the particular state law. 99
There have been remarkably few state constitutional challenges to confidenti-
ality rules in the lawyer discipline context. In Daily Gazette Co. v. Committee on
Legal Ethics,2°  the West Virginia Supreme Court used the state constitution to
find a right of public access to attorney disciplinary complaints, even when there
was no finding of probable cause, and a right of access to disciplinary hearings.
The court held that "the right of public access to attorney disciplinary
proceedings precludes utilization of private reprimand as a permissible sanc-
tion.",20 1 In that case, the West Virginia State Bar by-law provided that all
proceedings involving allegations of misconduct "shall be kept confidential until
and unless a recommendation for the imposition of public discipline is filed with
the court."'202 Yet the state constitution provided that "[t]he courts of this state
shall be open. 2°3 The court found that attorney disciplinary proceedings
conducted by the West Virginia State Bar Legal Ethics Committee are quasi-
judicial proceedings not exempted from constitutional protections. z°4 Although
other states with closed lawyer discipline procedures have similar state constitu-
tional provisions calling for an "open court," the issue has not been litigated in
those states.20 5 In the only other case in which a party attempted to gain access to
lawyer discipline records based on state constitutional free speech and due
process grounds, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the challenge, maintaining
198. The context in which these cases arise vary considerably. In some cases, accused lawyers seek
information about their own discipline case--or other cases-for the purposes of defending themselves or
attending certain proceedings. In other cases, the media seek access to discipline information for the purpose of
publication or for the purpose of defending libel actions. In a few cases, individual litigants seek disciplinary
information about a lawyer as part of the discovery process in civil cases. In virtually all of these cases, state
discipline agencies oppose those efforts, maintaining the right to keep the discipline information confidential.
199. Compare Sadler v. Or. State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218 (Or. 1976) (finding that the state's Open Records law
required disclosure of all communications received by the State Bar regarding the professional conduct of an
attorney and all documents disposing of matters raised in those communications), with Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. A.S. Abell Co., 452 A.2d 656 (Md. 1982) (finding that the state's Public Information Act did not
require disclosure to the press of notifications to complainants regarding the disposition of filed complaints
against attorneys, including private sanctions); see also Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Super. Ct., 354 P.2d 637, 650
(Cal. 1960) (state open records laws do not apply to State Bar discipline proceedings).
200. 326 S.E.2d 705,711 (W. Va. 1984).
201. Id. at 714. The court found that the only way to reassure the public of the integrity of lawyers was to
allow the public to observe for itself the hearing process and the decisions of the committee, including decisions
to dismiss complaints for lack of probable cause. Id. at 711-14.
202. Id. at 709.
203. W.VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 17.
204. See Daily Gazette Co., 326 S.E.2d at 708-09, 711-14.
205. For example, Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Missouri, and Utah all have closed discipline hearings, see
supra note 124 and accompanying text, yet they have "open court" state constitutional provisions similar to the
one in West Virginia. See ALA. CONST. art I, § 13; DEL. CONST. ART. I, § 9; IDAHO CONST. art I, § 18; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 11. Nevertheless, there has been no litigation in those states asserting a right of access to lawyer
discipline proceedings based on the state constitutional provisions.
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as confidential information that was acquired by an ethics commission prior to
the filing of a formal complaint in court.2 06
There also have been surprisingly few challenges to lawyer discipline
confidentiality rules based on common law or federal constitutional "right of
access" theories. Only one state supreme court has considered and upheld a
common law right of access claim in connection with an affidavit filed in a lawyer
discipline proceeding.20 7 The only state supreme court that has directly consid-
ered a federal constitutional right of access in the context of lawyer discipline
proceedings has rejected that claim. 20 8 More than thirty years ago, in McLaughlin
v. Philadelphia Newspapers,2° the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected efforts
by a newspaper publisher to obtain information about a discipline proceeding that
involved an assistant district attorney prior to the time he assumed that position.
According to long-standing court practice, the disciplinary proceedings were
conducted privately and the record of the proceeding was maintained as
confidential. In its decision, the court expressed great concern about maintaining
the reputation of lawyers and the interest in preserving the rehabilitative function
of private discipline for minor misconduct.210 Because the disciplined lawyer
was a private individual at the time of the discipline, and because the lawyer had
had an expectation that his statements would remain private if private discipline
were imposed, the court found that any right of access that may exist was
overborne by the "paramount" interest of the state in protecting confidentiality
under the circumstances presented. 21  The McLaughlin case was decided,
however, before some of the United States Supreme Court right of access
decisions described below.
206. See In re Goldstein, 995 P.2d 923 (Mont. 2000). In that case, even the respondent could not obtain the
information about his case. The discussion of the free speech claim under the state constitution was cursory. The
majority stated that there was no "free speech" claim under the state constitution, noting only that Doe v.
Supreme Court of Fla., 734 F Supp. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1990), was distinguishable. Goldstein, 995 P.2d at 930. The
dissent in the 4-3 decision was based primarily on due process grounds. Id.
207. In re Johnson, 461 N.W.2d 767 (S.D. 1990). That affidavit was filed with the disciplinary board, which
in turn filed the document with the Supreme Court. Id. at 768. Most jurisdictions recognize that the public
enjoys a common law right of access to judicial documents filed with the court. See infra notes 272-76 and
accompanying text.
208. McLaughlin v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 348 A.2d 376, 378 (Pa. 1974). In addition, New York
courts have indicated that there is no federal or state constitutional right and no common law right to attend
professional disciplinary hearings. See Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046, 1046 (N.Y.
1990) (noting in dictum in a dentist discipline case that there is no state or federal constitutional right to attend
professional disciplinary hearings). While the New York Court of Appeals has not squarely decided this issue
with respect to lawyer discipline proceedings, its statements in other cases indicate strong support for the
"general policy that disciplinary proceedings involving licensed professionals remain confidential until finally
determined." Doe v. Office of Prof'l Medical Conduct, 601 N.Y.S.2d 456,457 (1993).
209. McLaughlin, 348 A.2d at 377.
210. Id. at 381.
211. Id. at 382-83.
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING
PUBLIC ACCESS TO DISCIPLINE INFORMATION
A legal basis for making more lawyer discipline proceedings and records
available to the public may be found in cases involving federal constitutional
rights of access to judicial proceedings and court records. The courts have also
recognized a common law qualified right of access to judicial records which may
provide an additional basis for obtaining access to discipline information in some
jurisdictions. Neither approach is likely, however, to provide sufficient access to
some of the most important discipline information, including information about
the resolution of most complaints, private sanctions, and diversion.
1. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF AccEss
a. The Constitutional Case Law
The constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings was first recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.212
In that case, the Court recognized a qualified First Amendment right of public
access to attend criminal trials.21 3 The Court relied on the fact that throughout its
evolution, and at the time this country's organic laws were adopted, the criminal
trial had been presumptively open to the public.214 The Court found that openness
not only has therapeutic value for the public, but also promotes the perception of
fairness, confidence in the administration of justice, and the integrity and quality
of what takes place in the courtroom. 21-5 It noted that "[p]eople in an open society
do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing. 216
The Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press-
Enterprise H",)217 later described the Richmond Newspapers right of access
analysis as involving two "complementary considerations." First, "whether the
place and process have historically been open to the press and general public"
and second, "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question. ' The Press-Enterprise IH
Court noted that the right of access can be overcome by "an overriding interest
based on finding that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
212. 448 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980).
213. 1d. at 580.
214. Id. at 564-75.
215. Id. at570-71, 578.
216. Id. at 572.
217. 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise 11].
218. id. at 8.
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narrowly tailored to serve that interest. '21 9 In that case, it found a right of public
access to preliminary proceedings in criminal cases and the transcript of such
proceedings.22 ° The Court noted the frequency with which guilty pleas followed
a preliminary hearing, and observed that "the preliminary hearing in many cases
provided the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice
system.",221 It further noted that "the First Amendment question cannot be
resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., 'trial' or otherwise,
particularly where the preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale
trial.,
2 2 2
The United States Supreme Court has not directly considered whether the
public has a right of access to civil trials, but it noted in Richmond Newspapers
that "historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.
'223
Since then, many lower courts have recognized a First Amendment right of
access to civil trials.224 Courts have also occasionally applied the Richmond
Newspapers test to quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings.225 In some
cases, the courts have found a First Amendment right of access to such
proceedings.226
The lower courts have also found a First Amendment right of access to certain
judicial documents. Some courts have applied the two-prong Press-Enterprise H
inquiry to the question of whether there is a right of access to particular
219. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S 501, 510 (1984) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise 1]).
220. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13.
221. Id. at 12. The preliminary hearing process at issue in Press-Enterprise 1I could be used by the prosecutor
to obtain a finding of probable cause in lieu of a grand jury indictment. Even when the accused had been indicted
by a grand jury, he had a right to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate. During that hearing, the accused had
the right to appear, to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to exclude
illegally obtained evidence. Id.
222. Id. at 7.
223. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n. 17 (1980).
224. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); Westmoreland v.
CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1984); In re
Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801-02 (11th
Cir. 1983); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983); Doe v. Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 R Supp. 647 (S.D. Tex. 1996); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Super. Ct., 980
P.2d 337, 361 (Cal. 1999); State v. Cottman Transp. Sys., Inc., 542 A.2d 859, 862-64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
But see Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 331 F3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that
neither D.C. Circuit nor U.S. Supreme Court has stated that it would apply the Richmond Newspapers test to
anything other than criminal judicial proceedings).
225. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (deportation proceeding); Soc'y of
Prof'l Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D. Utah 1985) (administrative hearing), vacated as
moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002)
(university student disciplinary records).
226. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700 (right of access to deportation proceedings); Whiteland Woods,
L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (right of access to town planning commission
meetings). But see North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that there is
no right of access to deportation proceedings).
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documents, looking to whether there is a history of openness and whether access
plays a positive role in the functioning of the particular process. 227 In other cases,
the right of access to judicial documents has been viewed as "derived from or a
necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings. 228 The
types of documents to which the public has been found to have a First
Amendment right of access include criminal plea agreements, civil settlement
agreements deposited in court, and civil docket sheets.229
b. The Constitutional Right of Access to Lawyer Discipline Information
i. Access to Discipline Proceedings
The argument for a First Amendment right of access to lawyer disciplinary
proceedings is strongest in a dozen or so jurisdictions like New York where the
disciplinary hearing is closed to the public. 230 These hearings are usually the only
time when evidence relating to the charge of lawyer misconduct is heard. This
hearing is, in most jurisdictions, the closest that the lawyer comes to a "trial"
concerning the alleged misconduct.231
Reasonably strong arguments can be made for access to these hearings under
the first prong of the Press-Enterprise II test.232 The Supreme Court explained in
Press-Enterprise II that "because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable
judgment of experience, we have considered whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public. 2 3 3 The Court in Richmond
Newspapers indicated that it was appropriate to look at whether criminal trials
227. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2004); see also United States v.
Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that a number of circuits "have concluded that the logic
of Press-Enterprise II extends to at least some categories of court documents and records").
228. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93; United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994).
229. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93 (first amendment right of access to court docket sheets in
civil and family court cases); Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929-30 (7th Cir. 2002) (right of access to
settlement agreement); Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990) (qualified
first amendment right of access to plea agreements).
230. See supra note 124. An argument might also be made that discipline proceedings should be open before
a finding of probable cause, but it would be harder to sustain. In most jurisdictions the formal charge is made by
disciplinary counsel following an investigation and there is no actual hearing. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR
LAWYER DiscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11 (2001). At that point, the process resembles the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion or the grand jury process, to which there is no right of access. See Press-Enterprise II,
478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
231. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF LAWYER DIscIPLuNARY ENFORCEMENT R. 3 commentary (2001)
("Hearing committees conduct trials of formal charges ... ").
232. Some courts and commentators have questioned whether there must be a tradition of accessibility in
order to demonstrate a First Amendment right of access. See Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 182
(1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Suarez, 880 F2d
626,631 (2d Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839-42 (3d Cir. 1994) (relying primarily
on "logic" prong of test in absence of evidence supporting a tradition of openness). Thus, even if this prong is
not satisfied, a right of access might still be found.
233. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at. 8.
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were open "at the time when our organic laws were adopted, ' 2 34 but the Court in
Press-Enterprise II also considered the tradition of accessibility to preliminary
hearings starting somewhat later in this country's history.235 Since then, some
lower courts have looked to the openness of the proceeding as far back as the
colonial period and to more recent history to determine whether there has been a
tradition of accessibility.236 Where the procedure is of relatively recent origin, the
courts have also looked to analogous proceedings and documents of the same
"type or kind., 2 37
As previously noted, lawyer disciplinary proceedings were conducted in the
open for centuries in England and were also open to the public in the United
States at the time that the Bill of Rights was ratified. 38 Over the next 125 years,
lawyer discipline continued to be handled in open proceedings before the courts.
Court opinions and news coverage of lawyer discipline charges and proceedings
up until the early 1900s demonstrate that the disciplinary process remained open
until it was taken over by the organized bar.2 39 Even then, in a few jurisdictions,
public access to discipline proceedings was permitted as soon as a formal
complaint was filed.24°
The deep involvement of bar associations in lawyer discipline and their
increasing use of secrecy did not produce favorable results.2 41 By 1970, even the
ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement concluded
that the state of lawyer discipline was "scandalous" and recommended that the
courts take back responsibility for administering lawyer discipline.2 4 2 The Clark
Commission noted that many of the problems, including that "disciplinary
agencies will not proceed against prominent lawyers and law firms," occurred at
least in part because so much discipline was handled in secrecy.243 Since 1979,
234. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
235. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10-11. Moreover, the Supreme Court has considered whether a
proceeding has generally been open in many jurisdictions rather than focusing on the history of a particular
jurisdiction. See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1993).
236. See, e.g., North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); NBC, Inc. v. Presser,
828 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1987).
237. El Vocero, 508 U.S. at 150-51; Boston Herald, 321 F.3d at 184.
238. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
240. PRoBLEMs AND RECOMMENDATONS IN DIscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3, at 138. This typically
occurred in states that provide for trial of the charges by judges rather than by a referee or bar disciplinary
commission. Id.
241. I do not mean to suggest that bar association involvement in bar discipline was altogether a bad
development. Bar association involvement in discipline in the early twentieth century had the positive effect of
turning more attention to the subject of lawyer discipline and creating a mechanism for pursuing more lawyer
misconduct that occurred outside the courtroom.
242. Id. at 1.
243. Id. at 1-2. The Clark Commission was admittedly somewhat ambivalent about the idea of opening up
lawyer discipline to the public. Although the report cited as a problem "[i]nadequate provisions concerning
public disclosure of pending disciplinary proceedings," id. at 138, it recommended that many formal charges be
withheld until the charges had been sustained by the trial authority. Id.
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the ABA has recommended that discipline proceedings become public after a
finding of probable cause and the majority of states have now adopted that
procedure. 2" Thus, the favorable judgment of experience shows that the
historically open approach to lawyer discipline is the preferable approach in all
jurisdictions.245
The second prong of the Press-Enterprise II test-that public access plays a
significant positive role in the function of the discipline process-can easily be
satisfied. Relying on language from United States Supreme Court cases, the
lower courts have identified six structural interests to determine whether public
access plays a significant positive role including "informing the public discussion
of government affairs, assuring the public perception of fairness, promoting the
community-therapeutic effect of criminal justice proceedings, providing a public
check on corrupt practices, intimidating potential perjurers, and generally
enhancing the performance of all involved in the process. ' 2 "
All of these interests would be satisfied by public access to disciplinary
hearings. As is true for the preliminary criminal hearing, the lawyer disciplinary
hearing is often the final and most important step in the entire proceeding. That
hearing may be the sole occasion for public observation of the discipline system,
as there typically is no trial before the court.247 Open disciplinary hearings would
play a significant positive role in the functioning of the overall discipline process
244. See supra notes 97, 123 and accompanying text.
245. Only two cases-neither decided in the lawyer discipline context-argue against the conclusion that the
"history" prong favors openness. In First Amendment Coalition v. Jud. Inquiry & Rev. Board, 784 F.2d 467,468
(3d Cir. 1986) (en banc), the Third Circuit rejected arguments that there was a First Amendment right of access
to judicial disciplinary proceedings prior to the imposition of discipline. The court considered a challenge to a
Pennsylvania constitutional provision that provided for access to the records of the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board only if it recommended that the state Supreme Court impose public discipline on a judge. Id. In rejecting
the application of Richmond Newspapers' analysis to judicial discipline, the Third Circuit referred to the
judicial board's proceedings as "administrative proceedings" and noted that they did not have "a long history of
openness." Id. at 473-74. The court dismissed the argument that judicial discipline had traditionally involved
public impeachment, noting that "the Board's functions are intended to supplement rather than replace the
historical methods of judicial discipline: impeachment and removal for conviction of a crime." Id. at 472-73.
Some of the court's reasoning, which relied on its analogy to the secrecy of pre-trial criminal proceedings, was
undercut by the decision four months later in Press-Enterprise I. Moreover, the federal court was especially
mindful of the fact that it was dealing with a challenge to a state constitutional provision, which carries a heavy
presumption of validity. Id. at 475.
In the second case, Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046, 1047-49 (N.Y. 1990), the New
York Court of Appeals stated that there was no First Amendment right of access to professional disciplinary
hearings. But in that case, the court was considering a dental disciplinary hearing and appellants argued that the
court need not consider the historical tradition prong of the Press-Enterprise 11 test. Id. at 1046-47. There was
apparently no effort to present evidence of a historical tradition of openness. See id. at 1049 ("there is no
suggestion that professional disciplinary hearings have any tradition of being open to the public ....").
246. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 336 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly,
321 F.3d 174, 187 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1259 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1994).
247. See Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (noting that the preliminary hearing should be open
because it was often the only opportunity for the public to observe the criminal process).
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because they would also make citizens more aware of the process-and more
likely to resort to it-if they believe that their lawyers engage in wrongdoing.
Open disciplinary hearings would also contribute to public discussion about the
disciplinary process and the sanctions being imposed on officers of the court,
who are often needed for access to justice. As with open trials, the openness of
disciplinary proceedings would contribute to the appearance of fairness and
increase public confidence in the system.248 Open hearings would also undoubt-
edly have therapeutic effects on the community and the complainant. Open
hearings would also help discourage perjury behind closed doors and corrupt and
biased practices. 249 Furthermore, they would undoubtedly enhance the perfor-
mance of disciplinary counsel and all others involved in the disciplinary process
as their actions would be subject to public scrutiny.
The "quasi-criminal" nature of disciplinary proceedings 250 strengthens the
arguments for a constitutional right of access to disciplinary hearings under
Press-Enterprise II. In contrast to civil proceedings, the primary purpose of
lawyer discipline proceedings is protection of the public t.25  A close look at the
function and effect of incapacitating sanctions such as disbarment and suspension
reflect that they are, in fact, "punishment.
' 252
Any contention that disciplinary proceedings are not sufficiently "judicial" to
warrant a First Amendment right of access is also likely to be unsuccessful. 253 A
hearing committee's members are appointed by the courts, are supervised by the
courts, perform fact-finding for the courts, and in many cases, impose discipline
248. See generally Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
249. In Press-Enterprise II, the Court noted that the absence of a jury-which safeguards against overzealous
prosecutors and biased or compliant judges-makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing
"even more significant." 478 U.S. at 13. This observation is also true in the context of lawyer discipline
proceedings, where there is otherwise little public check on bias.
250. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968); see also Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 438 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to disciplinary proceedings as
"quasi-criminal" in nature).
251. See Levin, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 8, at 17 n. 77.
252. Id. at 18-19. While some courts have claimed that disciplinary sanctions are not "punishment," they do
this to avoid having to provide lawyers with a full panoply of rights provided by the Constitution to criminal
defendants. In virtually all jurisdictions, disciplinary counsel has prosecutorial-type powers, including the
power to subpoena, investigate, and bring charges. Id.
253. The only case that might support the argument is First Amendment Coalition v Jud. Inquiry & Rev.
Board, 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc). In that case, the court rejected First Amendment arguments by
media organizations in which they relied upon Richmond Newspapers in an effort to obtain access to the records
of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. In its decision, the court referred to the Board's functions as
"administrative proceedings, unlike conventional criminal and civil trials." Id. at 472. In order to support its
conclusion that the Board's hearing function was not judicial, the court noted that the Board could only make
recommendations and could not impose sanctions on judges. Id. at 473. In contrast, lawyer discipline agencies
often impose sanctions. Moreover, as previously noted, the vitality of the Third Circuit's decision in this case is
questionable in light of the subsequent decision in Press-Enterprise I. See supra notes 220-222 and
accompanying text.
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for the courts. 25 4 In most cases, the hearing committee's hearing functions as a
full-scale trial and is usually the only fact-finding that occurs. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that the delegation of the disciplinary function to bar
ethics committees makes those committees an "arm of the court in performing the
function of receiving and investigating complaints and holding hearings., 255 It
has also observed that the local ethics committees "may be analogized to the
function of a special master" and that disciplinary actions have an "essentially
judicial nature. 256
ii. Access to Discipline Records
Where there is a right to attend judicial proceedings, there is a concomitant
First Amendment right to access documents submitted in connection with the
proceedings. 25 7 Thus, the formal charges, transcripts of discipline hearings,
documents submitted to the hearing committee, and records concerning the
disposition of disciplinary matters should also be accessible to the public under a
First Amendment right of access theory. The more difficult question is whether
additional documents might be obtained through a constitutional right of access
claim, including access to the initial complaints258 or private sanctions.
One basis for obtaining additional discipline information may lie in the court
decisions recognizing a First Amendment right of access to court docket sheets.
The courts that have considered the issue have concluded that docket sheets
254. See ABA MODEL RuLEs FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 2 commentary (2001) (noting that
"the highest courts of the states cannot handle discipline and disability matters directly by themselves. The
agency assists the court in the exercise of its inherent power to supervise the bar ... ").
255. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 433-34 (1982); see also
Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Super. Ct., 354 P.2d 637, 644 (Cal. 1960) (noting that the "State Bar acts 'as an arm of
the court, for the purpose of taking evidence and making its recommendations"').
256. Middlesex County Ethics Comm, 457 U.S. at 434 n.13; see also Mosby v. Ligon, 418 E3d 927, 931-32
(8th Cir. 2005) (noting that disciplinary proceedings were judicial in nature and that because "the Committee
[on Professional Conduct] is created and appointed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, operates pursuant to rules
promulgated by that court, and is subject to review by that court, the Committee's decision to discipline [an
attorney] is the functional equivalent of a state-court judgment").
257. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
258. If the initial complaints are submitted as evidence in the discipline hearing, then they would presumably
be accessible to the public as a corollary to their right to attend the proceeding. Otherwise, it would be necessary
to apply the Press-Enterprise II logic and experience test to the documents, as some courts have done. There is a
long history of discipline complaints being raised before judges in open court and little evidence that the
complaints of the discipline matters were not open to the public until the bar became involved. Nevertheless, it
would be somewhat more difficult to satisfy the second prong of the test with respect to the documents than it is
to satisfy it with respect to the discipline hearing. So, for example, while it would be possible to show that access
to all complaints would help inform the public discussion of government affairs, assure the public perception of
fairness, provide a check on corrupt practices and enhance the performance of all involved, see text
accompanying note 246, it is less clear that access would intimidate potential pejurers or promote the
community-therapeutic effects of the proceedings.
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relating to judicial proceedings enjoy a presumption of openness. 259 Access to
docket sheets provides an opportunity for the public to understand "the system in
general and its workings in a particular case. 2 6 ° Important discipline information
can be derived from docket sheets in some jurisdictions, including the identities
of lawyers who have been charged and the sanctions imposed on lawyers. The
availability of docket sheets can also be used to reveal potential biases. 26 1 At a
minimum, in jurisdictions where courts can review the imposition of a private
admonition, 262 it should be possible to make a right of access claim to obtain
information about these sanctions from the courts' docket sheets. It is also
possible that a successful access claim could be mounted for the docket sheets of
state court disciplinary agencies on the theory that since they are the bodies that
impose private sanctions, they are judicial fora that are acting in the place of the
state courts.26 3
iii. The Balancing
If there is a qualified First Amendment right of access to disciplinary
proceedings and records, then the proceedings and records cannot be closed
unless "specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that 'closure is
necessary to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.," 264 It is very unlikely that this showing can be made. Preservation of the
integrity of the investigative process is not a "higher value" that would justify
limiting access to disciplinary hearings, documents submitted in those proceed-
ings, transcripts, or court docket sheets because the investigation would be
complete by the time of the hearing or before those documents were generated.265
Moreover, it seems doubtful that fairness to the lawyer or protection of a lawyer's
259. United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1028-29 (1lth Cir. 2005); Hartford Courant Co. v.
Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993); see also
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F Supp. 89,94-95 (D. Mass. 1993). This was true even in cases involving,
inter alia, the docket sheets for paternity proceedings where the proceeding itself may have been private. See
Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93.
260. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 95 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
572 (1980)).
261. See id. ("Precisely because docket sheets provide a map of the proceedings in the underlying cases,
their availability greatly enhances the appearance of fairness.").
262. See, e.g., DEL. LAWYERS' RULEs OF DiscnwLiNARY PROCEDURE R. 9(d)(5) (2004) [hereinafter DEL.
RuLEs]; IOWA RULES OF COURT R. 35.11(1), (2) (2006) (permitting appeal to be taken from dismissal of
complaint or imposition of private sanction).
263. The main obstacle that this argument would encounter is that there is no historical tradition of openness
of the docket sheets maintained by disciplinary agencies. However, some courts have not required a showing of
a tradition of openness for newer procedures if the second prong of the Press-Enterprise H1 test can be satisfied.
See supra note 228.
264. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (quoting Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
265. Even if access to the docket sheets of the disciplinary agency were sought, once a finding of probable
cause was made or the complaint was dismissed without finding probable cause, the investigation would be
largely complete and the integrity of the investigative process would not be affected. Moreover, most courts
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reputation are higher values than the public's right to observe what is happening
in the discipline process, especially after a finding of probable cause has been
made.2 66 Although a closer question, the interest in fairness to the attorney and
protection of reputational interests are probably not higher values, even when no
probable cause is found. 267 The argument for administrative efficiency typically
has not been found to be the type of higher value that outweighs First Amendment
rights.268 Likewise, the interest in rehabilitation has not been found to outweigh
First Amendment interests. 269 Finally, there is substantial evidence that the
reputation of the bar is actually undercut by secrecy, 270 so that argument would
unlikely to be found to be a "higher value" that overrides the public's First
Amendment right of access.
2. COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS CASES
Some lawyer discipline documents may also be obtained based on a common
law right of access. The most cited discussion of the historical common law right
appears in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.271 In that case, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether audiotapes which had been admitted
into evidence in the trials of President Richard Nixon's former advisors could be
copied for broadcasting and sale to the public. The Court noted that "[ilt is clear
that the courts in this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public
have rejected investigative integrity as an argument that outweighs First Amendment interests. See supra notes
158, 160-61 and accompanying text.
266. See generally In re Gitto Global Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7918, at *39-40 (D. Mass. May 2, 2005),
aff'd, 422 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2005) (interest in avoiding embarrassment and protecting privacy are insufficient to
overcome First Amendment interest in permitting public access to bankruptcy report filed in court).
267. The fact that no probable cause was found can be made public, along with the reasons why this
determination was made, so that interested parties who access the information can determine what weight, if
any, to give the complaint. At a minimum, a blanket statute or rule making all such records private may be
subject to attack as not sufficiently narrowly tailored. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 509
(Ist Cir. 1989) (striking down as unconstitutional a statute that sealed all criminal records in cases where there
was an acquittal or no probable cause was found).
268. See, e.g., R.M. v. Sup. Ct., 883 A.2d 369, 378 (N.J. 2005) (rejecting argument that administrative
interest in encouraging diversion justifies requiring complainant to maintain confidentiality of complaint). But
see generally First Amendment Coalition v. Jud. Inquiry & Rev. Board, 784 F.2d 467,476 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting
that state has substantial interest in confidentiality because it increases flexibility by allowing judges to resign
rather than go through discipline process).
269. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-106 (1979) (state's interest in rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders does not outweigh First Amendment rights); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp 89,
98 (D. Mass. 1993) (noting that protection of state's interest in reintegration and rehabilitation of defendants can
be effected through means other than burdening First Amendment right of access). Moreover, there would have
to be a clear showing and specific findings that keeping all discipline information private is necessary for
rehabilitation. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1986) ("The First Amendment right of access cannot
be overcome by (a] conclusory assertion."). In the absence of empirical evidence supporting this claim, it would
be difficult to make this showing.
270. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
271. 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978).
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records and documents, including judicial records and documents. 272 Although
the Court observed that the contours of the qualified right of access "had not been
delineated with any precision," it explained that "[tihe interest necessary to
support the issuance of a writ compelling access has been found, for example, in
the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies. 273
While the Nixon Court considered materials that had been admitted at trial, the
common law right also extends to judicial documents not introduced in open
court
2 7 and to other public records.2
75
Both lower federal courts and state courts recognize the common law right to
inspect judicial documents.276 This right of access allows the citizenry to monitor
the courts277 and serves as a check on arbitrary judicial behavior. It also promotes
public confidence in the legal system.2 7 8 The common law right is broader than
the First Amendment right because the common law right attaches to virtually all
judicial records and documents without the need to show a historic tradition of
openness. 279 The common law right is typically asserted on a case-by-case basis
and obviously cannot, like a constitutional challenge, invalidate statutes. Indeed,
the common law right may be expanded or limited in some jurisdictions by
statute.28°
272. Id. The Court concluded, however, that the sole method by which the tapes could be accessed were
specified in the Presidential Recordings Act. Id. at 603.
273. Id. at 597-98.
274. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F2d 1304, 1312-13 (1 1th Cir. 2001);
In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001).
275. E.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 89 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[Jludicial
records are but a subset of the universe of documents to which the common law right applies."). Courts differ
over the extent to which the common law right of access extends to public records in the executive and
legislative branches. Compare Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (common law right of access extends to all branches of government), with Boston Herald, Inc. v.
Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2003) (common law right of access has applied only to judicial
documents), and Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Roberts, 839 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2003) (no common law right
of access to legislative records). Since disciplinary activities are typically supervised within the judicial branch,
the analysis with respect to the other branches is not developed here.
276. See, e.g., Holland v. Eads, 614 So. 2d 1012, 1014-15 (Ala. 1993); Ark. Best Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp., 878 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Ark. 1994); In re Johnson, 598 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. App. 1992); Roman Catholic
Diocese of Lexington v. Noble, 92 S.W.3d 724 (Ky. 2002); People v. Atkins, 514 N.W.2d 148, 149 (Mich.
1994); Republican Co. v. Appeals Court, 812 N.E. 2d 887, 891 (Mass. 2004); State v. Cribbs, 469 N.W.2d 108
(Neb. 1991); see also Daily News v. Teresi, 706 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div. 2000) (noting that state recognizes
common law right of access to court records but looks to federal courts for instruction).
277. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404,410 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied
Extrusion Tech., 988 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993); Roman Catholic Diocese of Lexington, 92 S.W.3d at 732.
278. Wash. Legal Found., 89 F.3d at 901.
279. See, e.g., Va. Dept. of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Gotti, 322 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
280. See In re Gitto Global Corp, 422 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (common law right of access supplanted by
broader approach to access under Bankruptcy Code); Ctrfor Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 936 (common law
right of access pre-empted by statutory disclosure scheme of FOIA); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246,
1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (common law right of access superseded by CJA statute and regulations); Virmani v.
Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 691 (N.C. 1999) (statute supplants common law right to
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Lower courts have applied different tests to determine whether a document is a
"judicial document" subject to the common law right of access. Some courts have
indicated that the document simply must be "physically filed" with the court.28'
Other courts have said that the filed document must also be "relevant to the
performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process. 282
"Judicial documents" subject to common law access claims have included
sentencing letters sent directly to judges,283 settlement agreements in the courts'
files,284 and reports prepared for the court.285
The courts have also taken somewhat different approaches to determining the
weight to be given to the common law presumption of access. Most courts have
characterized the presumption as "strong ' 286 and have required a "compelling
reason, accompanied by specific factual findings" to justify keeping the
documents from the public.287 A few courts have stated that the presumption of
access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of
judicial power and the resultant value of such information to monitoring the
courts.288 So, for example, the presumption might be strong with respect to
evidence introduced at trial, but far weaker with respect to discovery documents,
inspect medical review committee records); KNSD Channels 7/39 v.- Super. Ct., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 597
(1998) (noting common law right of access to judicial proceedings where no contrary statute).
281. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Doe v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Md.,
103 F. Supp. 2d 856 (D. Md. 2000); Johnson, 598 N.E.2d at 410.
282. United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Amodeo I]; see also In re Policy
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254, 94-2341, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25900 (4th Cit. Sept. 13, 1995) (document
becomes a judicial document when court relies on it to determine substantive rights); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1, 13 (lst Cir. 1986).
283. United States v. Gotti, 322 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y 2004); see also United States v. Kushner, 349 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 906 (D. N.J. 2005) (making available sentencing letters relied upon by judge in sentencing).
284. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929-30 (7th Cir. 2002).
285. Amodeo 1, 44 F.3d at 146 (finding that report of court-appointed monitor investigating union corruption
was a "judicial document" presumptively subject to public inspection); Ashworth v. Bagley, 351 F. Supp. 2d 786
(S.D. Ohio 2005) (allowing access to competency report prepared by court-appointed doctor); United States v.
Kushner, 349 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D. N.J. 2005) (allowing access to sentencing memorandum prepared by
probation department).
286. E.g., FTrC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981);
Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1988) ("strong presumption" in favor of
accessibility).
287. E.g., In re Johnson, 598 N.E.2d 406,411 (111. App. 1992); see also FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp.,
830 F.2d at 410; In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Only the most
compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.").
288. This approach was articulated in United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1047-49 (2d Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Amodeo I1], with respect to Article Im judges, but it has been followed both by federal and state
courts that have considered the weight to be afforded the common law right of access. See, e.g., United States v.
Kushner, 349 F. Supp. 2d 892, 904-05 (D. N.J. 2005); Roman Catholic Diocese of Lexington v. Noble, 92
S.W.3d 724, 732 (Ky. 2002).
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289
which play little role in the exercise of judicial power.
Obviously the easiest argument for access can be made with respect to
discipline documents that are filed with the courts. For example, in In re
Johnson,290 a lawyer filed an affidavit acknowledging the truth of accusations
and consenting to discipline with the state bar Disciplinary Board; the affidavit
was then automatically filed with the South Dakota Supreme Court. The Court
concluded this was a "judicial record" subject to the common law judicial record
privilege. The governing statute provided that the "order disbarring the attorney
on consent shall be a matter of public record," but the affidavit "shall not be
publicly disclosed or made available for any use in any other proceeding except
upon order of the Supreme Court., 2 9 1 The court noted that "the public has a
general right to monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality,
honesty and respect for our legal system., 292 Although the state argued that
disclosure may discourage other attorneys from submitting such affidavits,
thereby prolonging disciplinary litigation, the court did not find this reason
compelling in the context of that particular case.2 93
In jurisdictions where disciplinary boards are required to submit their
recommendations to the court,2 94 there would also appear to be a common law
right of access to those recommendations. Such a challenge might be mounted in
Delaware, for example, which treats as confidential the Disciplinary Board's
report and recommendations that are submitted to the Supreme Court in matters
where it recommends dismissal or that private discipline be imposed.2 95
Likewise, any records of private discipline and diversion agreements that are
filed with the court, and any private sanctions imposed by the court, should be
subject to a common law right of access. 2 9 6 The interests underlying the common
289. Amodeo H, 71 F.3d at 1050; United States v. Kushner, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 904. Even at its strongest, it
appears that the common law presumption does not give rise to as high a burden as does the presumption of
access under the First Amendment. See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006).
290. 461 N.W.2d 767, 768 (S.D. 1990).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 769.
293. Id. at 769-70. One important reason why the argument was rejected in that case was because the public
had already been permitted substantial access to the records.
294. It is not uncommon to require the Disciplinary Board to prepare a written report for the court indicating
whether it recommends that dismissal should occur or a sanction should be imposed. See, e.g., ABA MODEL
RuLEs FOR LAWYER DISCIPLNARY ENFORCEMENT R. 1l(E)(1) (2001). Some jurisdictions also require that
diversion agreements be filed with the court. See, e.g., KAN. SUP. CT. R. 205(c)(4) (2005).
295. DEL. RULES R. 9(e), 13. Under the Delaware Rule, the reports are "submitted" to the court and not filed
with the court, but this distinction should not necessarily make a difference in the common law analysis.
Presumably the reports are required to be submitted to the court so that the court can supervise the discipline
process. Certainly the public has the same interests in access to the documents even if-or perhaps particularly
if-the court does not actually review the reports that have been submitted to it.
296. One hurdle that would need to be overcome in some jurisdictions is the claim that a statute requiring
confidentiality supercedes the common law. In some jurisdictions, courts have found that statutory
confidentiality requirements can limit the common law right of access, see supra note 276 and accompanying
text, but have not taken the same position with respect to court rules. But see In re Werfel, 260 N.Y.S.2d 791,
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law right of access-including "the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the
workings of public agencies, 297 -would be furthered by permitting access.
Of course, even if there is a common law presumption of access, this can be
rebutted if countervailing interests outweigh the public interests in access. Some
of the factors that the courts weigh in the common law balancing include whether
the documents are sought for an improper purpose, the privacy interests of parties
opposing disclosure, and law enforcement concerns.298 In the context of a lawsuit
based on a claimed public right of access to discipline records, it is unlikely that
there could be a showing of an "improper purpose. '299 Likewise, it would be hard
to demonstrate that law enforcement concerns should overcome the right of
access, especially if the information is not sought until after a determination has
been made to dismiss a complaint, impose diversion or a private sanction, or
proceed with a disciplinary hearing. It is similarly unlikely that disclosure of this
information would seriously implicate the privacy interests of third parties, who
presumably recognized the possibility that discipline would be public when they
made their complaints. 3° Courts have also rejected administrative efficiency 301
and reputational interests of a party as a reason for denying access to judicial
records that are presumptively open.3°2 At least with respect to private sanctions,
diversion agreements, and dismissals, it would be difficult to show a "compelling
796 (App. Div. 1965) (stating in dictum that the "general policy" of the state is to allow public access to all
records, "'at least where secrecy is not enjoined by statute or rule"') (quoting New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz,
143 N.E.2d 256, 260 (N.Y. 1957)). In most states, the rules governing the confidentiality of lawyer discipline
proceedings are court rules and not legislative enactments, and they often leave latitude for the court's
discretion. See, e.g., DEL. RuLEs R. 13(a) (providing for confidentiality of hearing panels' submissions
concerning dismissals and private discipline "unless and until ordered by the Court").
297. Nixon v. Warner Commc'n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978).
298. Va. Dept. of State Police v. Wash. Post., 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting one of factors to be
weighed is "whether the records are sought for improper purposes"); Amodeo II, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting that the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure are a competing consideration); Haber v.
Evans, 268 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing countervailing law enforcement concerns).
299. Presumably most efforts to obtain access to the documents would come from the media or public
interest groups. The Second Circuit has recently reiterated that it will not explore the motives of the media for
seeking documents under the common law privilege. See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110,
123 (2d Cir. 2006).
300. See generally Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Super. Ct., 354 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1960) ("Persons giving the
information must realize that, just as when public disciplinary action follows, their information is subject to
release, so it is when private disciplinary action is taken."). Moreover, if the privacy of a third party is ever a
serious concern, the court retains the power to redact certain information before releasing documents.
301. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 461 N.W.2d 767, 770 (S.D. 1990) (concluding that affidavit consenting to
discipline should be disclosed notwithstanding disciplinary board's "strong interest" in expediting disciplinary
hearings).
302. E.g., Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (prospective injury to
reputation of a party "is generally insufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of public access to
court records"); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 279 N.W.2d 179, 190 (Wis. 1979) ("Possible damage to arrested
persons' reputations does not outweigh the public interest in allowing inspection of the police records which
show the charges upon which arrests were made."). But see generally Haber, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (allowing
name of accused officer who was cleared of wrongdoing to be redacted from Bureau of Professional
Responsibility records disclosed during litigation).
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reason, accompanied by specific factual findings," to justify keeping the material
from the public.
CONCLUSION
The case for less secrecy in lawyer discipline is strong when the public is being
victimized by lawyers who are awaiting private discipline hearings or who have
been the repeated subject of private sanctions. The case is further bolstered by the
unanswered questions that private discipline and diversion have produced. For
example, if we do not know what percentage of lawyers who receive private
dispositions later engage in additional misconduct, it becomes difficult to defend
private sanctions or diversion programs. Likewise, if we do not know whether
differences occur in the handling of complaints, in the decisions about diversion,
or in the imposition of private sanctions when minorities and solo lawyers are the
targets, then it is hard to convince anyone that the lawyer discipline process is
fair.
Litigation raising First Amendment and common law right of access claims
can make inroads into the confidentiality that continues to surround lawyer
discipline proceedings in some jurisdictions even after probable cause is found.
Case law can also be used to obtain additional access to some discipline
documents and docket sheets that are currently kept confidential. Unfortunately,
information about dismissed complaints, private sanctions, and diversion agree-
ments that are never submitted to the courts may prove harder to obtain under
First Amendment or common law right of access theories. In the end, access to
this important information will depend upon the willingness of courts or
legislatures to devise discipline rules or laws that give more weight to the public's
interests.
At a minimum, these rules should provide that if a discipline complaint is
docketed by the disciplinary agency, the public can learn what happened to the
complaint shortly after it is docketed.3 ° 3 In view of the potential injury to a
lawyer's reputation that could be caused by a baseless complaint, I am not
suggesting that the complaint become public immediately upon docketing. I am
proposing, however, that if a complaint is docketed, the public should be able to
learn shortly thereafter that a lawyer had a complaint against him summarily
dismissed (as well as the reasons for dismissal), that he received a minor
sanction, that he agreed to diversion, or that there was a probable cause
303. As previously noted, docketing is typically performed by the disciplinary counsel's staff and occurs
after initial scrutiny of the complaint to determine that the complaint cannot be resolved through a phone call
and that it falls within the jurisdiction of the disciplinary agency. See ABA MODEL RuLES FOR LAWYER
DIscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11 (2001); supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. Even if the docketing
decision becomes public in all instances, agency personnel responsible for making the docketing decision are
immune from suit for any conduct arising from their official duties. ABA MODEL RULEs FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 12(A) (2001).
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determination. 3°
How widely this information should be publicized, and whether there should
be a time limit on access to the information, are admittedly not easy questions.
These questions deserve careful consideration.3 °5 At a minimum, information
about all disciplinary sanctions should be easily accessible to the public for some
period of time.3 °6 While fairness and rehabilitation arguments can be made for
why dismissed complaints and diversion agreements should not be accessible on
public websites or should not be available indefinitely, they should, at a
minimum, be accessible for research and should be maintained for the purpose of
determining in a later disciplinary hearing whether there is a pattern of
misconduct.
The time is past due for the lawyer discipline process to again be open to the
public. The current lawyer disciplinary system does a good job of protecting
lawyers' interests, but it is far less effective at protecting the public. Quite simply,
the wrong balance has been struck. The primary purpose of lawyer discipline
should be the protection of the public, but confidentiality rules and private
dispositions make it virtually impossible to determine whether the lawyer
disciplinary process achieves that goal. Moreover, the costs of secrecy are
substantial. Secrecy makes it impossible to determine whether the system is fair,
and there is evidence that even lawyers-the primary beneficiaries of confidenti-
ality-believe it is not. We also know that many clients do not think the system is
fair. Distrust of the process by clients and the public not only undermines their
views of the lawyer discipline system; it makes them suspicious of lawyers, of the
court system, and of the administration of justice. If these are the costs of
protecting confidentiality in the lawyer discipline process, then the price of
secrecy is too high.
304. Florida currently takes this approach. See FLA. RuLEs R. 3-7.1(a)(5).
305. The few states that have wrestled with this question have reached different conclusions. West Virginia
permits access to all dismissed complaints and the reasons for their dismissal, but requires an inquiry to the
disciplinary authority to obtain this information. See W. VA. RULES R. 2.9(b). Florida permits access to
dismissed complaints, but only retains them for a year; see also supra note 122.
306. Difficult-to-obtain discipline information does not protect the public. In California, even information
about "private" reprimands is published on the State Bar's website, on the theory that this is no different than
answering telephone inquiries to the State Bar about a lawyer's disciplinary history. See Mack v. State Bar., 112
Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 345 (2001).
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